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Reply to Attn of: (_- 1 November 21, 1996
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Goldin:
In accordance with the charge you presented us in your letter of June 7, 1996, The Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel is pleased to submit to you our final report for transmittal to the White
House. This report covers the scope detailed in the study Terms of Reference.
Overall, we have concluded that the efforts to streamline the Space Shuttle program have not
inadvertently created unacceptable flight or ground risks. We call your attention, however, to the
multiple observations and recommendations in the report which address the clear need for NASA
to take steps to ensure the availability of a skilled and experienced civil service workforce in
sufficient numbers to meet ongoing safety needs. These personnel issues are challenging and
have the potential to adversely impact risk in the future.
It must also be noted that synergism among the studied issues as well as interactions with other
major ongoing activities not specifically studied also have the potential to generate safety
problems. For example, the need to schedule any Reduction in Force during the initial
assembly of the International Space Station is a significant concern. Likewise, unrealistic
funding levels and imposed schedules which are not based on the true maturity of systems can
place undue pressure on NASA and contractor managements. Meeting the demands of these
externally applied pressures can force decisions which increase safety risks. The Panel
believes that it is essential for NASA and its contractors to examine continuously the
cumulative as well as the individual effects of all of these factors and to voice any concerns
which may result. These concerns, in turn, should be dealt with positively and non-punitively
by the Executive and Legislative branches of government in the interest of maintaining
NASA's essential human space flight programs at acceptably low safety risk levels.
Very truly yours,
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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EXECUTIVESUMMARY
At the request of the President of the United States through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), the NASA Administrator tasked the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel with the responsibility to identify and review issues associated with the
safe operation and management of the Space Shuttle program arising from ongoing
efforts to improve and streamline operations. These efforts include the consolidation
of operations under a single Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), downsizing
the Space Shuttle workforce and reducing costs of operations and management.
The Panel formed five teams to address the potentially significant safety impacts of
the seven specific topic areas listed in the study Terms of Reference. These areas
were (in the order in which they are presented in this report):
* Maintenance of independent safety oversight
Implementation plan for the transition of Shuttle program management to
the Lead Center
• Communications among NASA Centers and Headquarters
• Transition plan for downsizing to anticipated workforce levels
• Implementation of a phased transition to a prime contractor for operations
• Shuttle flight rate for Space Station assembly
• Planned safety and performance upgrades for Space Station assembly
The study teams collected information through briefings, interviews, telephone
conversations and from reviewing applicable documentation. These inputs were
distilled by each team into observations and recommendations which were then
reviewed by the entire Panel. The main observations and all of the recommenda-
tions are presented in the balance of this summary.
OBSERVATIONS
Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight
The ongoing transitions were assessed with respect to their potential impacts on the
independence of the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organizational structure
of both NASA and its contractors, the existence of independent reporting paths for
safety concerns and the existence and strength of independent assessment functions.
Organizational independence has not changed significantly as a result of the
ongoing transitions. NASA's S&MA organization remains independent of its line
operations. The new SFOC contractor, United Space Alliance (USA), retains the
same organization as its predecessor in which the S&MA function does not report
independently of line operations. Hence, the status quo with respect to the orga-
nizational independence of both the NASA and contractor S&MA functions has
been maintained.
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2 The withdrawal of NASA personnel from day-to-day interfaces with their con-
tractor counterparts has the potential to eliminate a significant independent
reporting path. Even though NASA plans to retain a strong presence on the work
floor and in contractor facilities, some of the team aspect of the NASA/contractor
relationship will surely be lost. This may reduce the likelihood of contractor per-
sonnel utilizing their NASA associates to elevate issues they are reluctant to raise
to their own management. Also, given the long established working relationships
of most of the current individuals in the NASA and contractor contract manage-
ment positions, the extra layer of management imposed by the SFOC structure
should not represent an impediment to accurate or timely reporting. A problem
could arise, however, with any successors to the incumbents who may not have the
same depth of working relationship upon which to rely.
The independent assessment functions of both NASA and the contractor have
been broadened. This will provide somewhat increased evaluation of processes and
promulgation of lessons learned but is not intended as a total replacement fi_r the
NASA in-line S&MA activities which have been eliminated.
In the longer range outlook, independence may be further eroded through the loss
of critical skills and experience among NASA personnel. NASA should not be
misled by the apparent initial success of all of the transition efforts. A major test of
the robustness of the new approach will likely be faced after there is significant
turnover among incumbents at all levels. It is therefore important to maintain an
adequate level of independent assessment and surveillance even after it appears
that the transitions have been successfully accomplished.
Lead Center/Communications
NASA has transitioned the Space Shuttle program to a Lead Center management
organization. The essence of the Lead Center type management is the delegation
to a single NASA field center of the overall program management authority for an
activity that inw_lves the participation of other NASA field centers. This concept
is not new to either NASA or the Space Shuttle program.
The Lead Center management mode for the Space Shuttle is working well under the
leadership of the existing managers. To date, the project and element managers
appear generally satisfied with the arrangement and seem to be active participants in
it. This can likely be attributed to the fact that these individuals have been working
together for over a decade and have come to know, respect and trust one another.
A multiplicity of formal communications channels exist and are used for transmitting
information both upward and downward in the program. In addition, horizontal
informal communication is encouraged and keeps counterparts and other interacting
individuals among the several organizations in daily contact about events and
issues of mutual interest.
The center directors involved are generally satisfied with their roles under the Lead
Center mode. Their ability to quickly deploy their center's resources against emerg-
ing problems is especially appreciated. Some did express a concern about the
impactof "full costaccounting"andthepotentialof havingto re-programtheir
budgetsbeforetakingnecessaryactions.
As yet,thegoverningdocumentsthat aretheformalmechanismsforestablishing
anddescribingtheLeadCentermodeof managementhavenot beenissued.It is
understoodthatthereareteamsworkingonthedevelopmentof suchdocuments,
andtheyarenearingcompletion.It isvital thatthesedocumentsclearlydefinethe
scopeof authorityof all levelsof managerssoasto minimizemicro-management
fromabove.
Themanagersof theprojectsandelementsare,forthemostpart,long-termNASA
employees,manyof whomareapproachingtheageforvoluntaryretirement.It was
agreedbythoseinterviewedthatit isnot toosoonto takestepsto assuretheavail-
abilityofwell-trainedsuccessorsexperiencedin theLeadCentermanagementmode.
Downsizing
NASA is projectinga significant"downsizing"of its civil serviceworkforcein
responseto budgetarypressuresandthereorganizationofgovernmentdepartments.
It isclearthatthisdownsizingrepresentsasubstantialmanagementchallengeand
apotentialsafetyconcernastheagencyshiftsprogrammanagementresponsibility
fromHeadquartersto fieldcentersandimplementsthe SpaceFlightOperations
ContractformanagingtheSpaceShuttle.
Thedownsizingplansraisefourseparatebutcloselyrelatedquestions:
(1) Are the projectedpersonnellevelsin the fiscalyear99/00 timeframe at
NASA and the United Space Alliance (USA) acceptable in terms of main-
taining safety?
(2) Do NASA and USA have the appropriate skills and experience mix to main-
tain acceptable safety levels during this period of downsizing?
(3) What management tools and incentives are needed to achieve the projected
personnel levels during this period while still maintaining the requisite skills
and experience mix?
(4) Will the downsizing process itself become a significant disruption and obstacle
to successful Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) operations?
Although the Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) will all be hard pressed to meet out-
year personnel targets without an involuntary Reduction in Force (RIF) and its
attendant disruption, the circumstances that confront NASA management and
employees at KSC are particularly difficult. NASA top management had previously
explored with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress an
enhanced buyout provisions that would have provided between 50 percent and 80
percent of current salary to NASA personnel who were eligible for retirement, but
this version was rejected. Amounts of $50,000 and $35,000 were also explored and
rejected. Instead, the earlier buyout incentive of $25,000 was renewed. Linking the
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such as the Career Plus Program at JSC will improve the attractiveness of the
$25,000 amount as well as keeping experienced NASA employees available for
part-time work. However, these linkages will require a legislative change to permit
persons who accept any buyout to have the opportunity to continue part-time
NASA employment. This approach could provide NASA the flexibility needed to
attempt to reach targeted personnel cuts and maintain a balance of skills and expe-
rience during this period of intense activity and transition.
Space Flight Operations Contract
In order to reduce costs through efficiencies believed to be inherent in the private
sector and reorient NASA's focus from operations to research, development and
technology, NASA has implemented a plan for privatizing space flight operations
for the Space Shuttle. The first phase of that plan is a consolidation of a majority
of Space Shuttle processing support contractors and some NASA operational
activities into a single Space Flight Operations Contract negotiated with United
Space Alliance.
Based upon the Program Management Plan and the personnel, organization and
management philosophies of the United Space Alliance, the Space Flight
Operations Contract appears to be a comprehensive and workable document
espousing safety as paramount throughout.
Overall, the documentation reviewed and discussions held reflect minimal adverse
safety implications, especially in the short term. This is largely because the people
currently in place are dedicated to making the new scheme work. There is some
uncertainty about the future, however. Careful and continuous monitoring by top
management and the safety organizations of both NASA and USA will be
required to ensure continued safe operations as new people come on the scene,
budget pressures continue to mount and the profit imperative increases on the part
of the contractor.
Further reductions of funding could derail an otherwise well planned SFOC imple-
mentation. This could wreak hardships on people and foster an over confident or
"workaround" attitude, either of which could have serious safety implications.
While "safety" is a popular byword in the Space Shuttle program, dollar constraints
may limit the ability to perform the tasks necessary to minimize risk. It is not evi-
dent how a situation such as this would be handled should it develop.
Manifest/Shuttle Enhancements
The manifest for the next six years is challenging. The planned schedule of seven
launches per year, with surges to eight, is feasible with current personnel levels. An
augmented schedule, at a rate of eight or nine launches per year, may be feasible
only with additional resources, but it is probably too early to make a proper judg-
ment in view of all of the changes underway. In any case, slips of several months
for individual launches should be expected.
Thereisnoadditionalsafetyriskrelatedto thepresentmanifestwhicharisesfrom
themoveto asingleoperationscontractor.However,therewardsandpenaltiesof
the incentiveSFOCmaymotivatethecontractorto actionswhichareunantici-
patedbyeitherpartytodayandwhichmayposeadditionalrisksto safeoperations
in thefuture.
TheplannedprogramforSpaceShuttleenhancementsappearswellconceivedand
capableofmeetingtheneedsoftheInternationalSpaceStation(ISS).Manyofthe
changesbeingincorporatedreduceriskaswell whichprovidesanoverallsafety
benefitto theprogram.While thechangesall seemconceptuallysound,adequate
testingandcertificationarerequiredbeforetheyareused.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Maintenanceof IndependentSafetyOversight
Recommendation 1.
NASA and USA should retain the present S&MA processes with respect to safety
critical operations until surveillance results and the performance of USA as the
SFOC contractor clearly indicate that safety controls, including the maintenance
of realistic independent safety reporting channels, are well established. Thereafter,
sufficient surveillance and independent assessment activities should remain so that
any difficulties arising from subsequent personnel turnover can be identified.
Recommendation 2.
NASA should retain a physical presence on the work floor at the space flight cen-
ters and at all contractors performing safety critical operations. True insight into
safety practices requires personal interfaces and assured access to work in process at
all times. Periodic independent assessment activities, audits and analyses of metrics
are not sufficient to provide the degree of independent safety oversight required to
operate the Space Shuttle program at minimum risk levels in the absence of a
NASA physical presence on the work floor.
Recommendation 3.
NASA should evolve its independent safety oversight efforts into a system in
which it receives notification of all changes, anomalies and recertifications from
the SFOC contractor. These notifications should carry the contractor's assessment
of whether they are in- or out-of-family. NASA should retain approval authority
for the contractor's classification of the action. When NASA judges a change or
anomaly to be critical, it should exercise final approval authority over the contrac-
tor's plans and activities. It is considered vital to the maintenance of independent
safety oversight that NASA maintain the final judgment relative to the application
of the definition of in- and out-of-family events.
Recommendation 4.
The long term maintenance of independent safety oversight will require NASA to
develop and implement programs for critical skills retention and for the generation
of direct Space Shuttle operating experience among NASA employees.
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NASA should continue its announced policy that "anyone involved can stop a Space
Shuttle launch." Together with the NASA Safety Reporting System, this should help
encourage people to employ the available independent reporting pathways.
Lead Center/Communications
Recommendation 6.
The development of the governing documents for the Lead Center mode of pro-
gram management should be expedited. Particular attention should be given to
assure that the resulting documents establish clear and unambiguous definitions of
the scope of responsibilities and authorities of all levels of management within a
program. Provisions should be incorporated to preclude the possibility of micro-
management. Acknowledgment should be given to the importance of mutual
respect and trust among the managers for the success of this (and any other) mode
of management of complex programs.
Recommendation 7.
There should be a high level, internal, periodic review of the Lead Center
management structure and its operations. This review should examine whether the
concept is functioning as intended.
Recommendation 8.
Measures should be taken to assure that individuals ascending to positions of
authority within the program are properly trained in the Lead Center philosophy
so that deviations in management operations will not occur.
Downsizing
Recommendation 9.
NASA workfi_rce downsizing should be preceded by successful reductions in work
requirements to ensure that arbitrary employment targets do not adversely affect
the safety of Space Shuttle and International Space Station operations. Field cen-
ters, especially the Kennedy Space (;enter, should be given latitude and flexibility
in achieving scope of work reductions and revising targeted personnel levels as the
work content changes.
Recommendation 10.
NASA should renew its appeal to OMB and the Congress to gain approval of an
enhanced buyout provision of at least $50,000. The Congress is urged to
consider the request favorably. Using the flexibility achieved through an attractive
buyout package, NASA should be permitted to resume limited hiring of younger
engineering and scientific personnel. An enhanced buyout provision would be an
important tool to help avoid a disruptive inw_luntary Reduction in Force (RIF)
along with the distortions in skills and experience that will likely be a direct by-
product of a RIE
Recommendation 11.
NASA should seek legislative approval to combine its buyout authority, regardless
of amount, with the phased retirement, Partners in Education, and Partners in
Technologyprovisions of the Career Plus program. This approach will enhance the
attractiveness of any buyout package and keep available for part-time work some of
NASA's most knowledgeable employees during this period of intense activity and
transition.
Recommendation 12.
The institutional and fimctional role of the Kennedy Space Center in the post-
2000 period should be defined, and a personnel strategy for KSC and the SFOC
contractor that is appropriate to that role should be devised. A prompt decision on
this issue will also be of considerable value to USA as it implements the terms of
the SFOC.
Recommendation 13.
NASA should continue to develop alternative employment opportunities, such
as those associated with Space Shuttle upgrades and ISS integration, for KSC
employees who otherwise would leave to avoid a RIF or who would be involuntarily
separated through a RIF.
Space Flight Operations Contract
Recommendation 14.
Plans should be developed to assure that successor managers for both NASA and
the SFOC contractor are nurtured in an environment that cultivates mutual
respect and trust for one another typical of the excellent organization in place
today.
Recommendation 15.
NASA should continue to monitor the transition to the SFOC to assure that all
requirements are being met in an orderly way and that the safety of operations
remains the prime consideration.
Recommendation 16.
Congress and NASA should provide a level of funding sufficient to assure a safe
SFOC implementation.
Recommendation 17.
A periodic audit of the standards by which NASA monitors the safety performance
of the SFOC contractor should be conducted by an independent group.
Recommendation 18.
NASA and USA must maintain an adequate focus on resolving current and future
obsolescence and logistics support issues in order to avoid potential safety problems.
Manifest/Shuttle Upgrades
Recommendation 19.
The Space Shuttle program and the SFOC contractor should continue to empha-
size safety first as a way of life and enforce the precedence of safety, manifest and
cost in Space Shuttle operations.
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8 Recommendation 20.
NASA and SFOC contractor managements should enforce the safety priority using
good management judgment and, if possible, derive measures of processing and
launch crew efficiency and fatigue as they affect the safety of operations.
Recommendation 21.
Any decision to move to a higher launch rate (8 or 9 per year) should be delayed
until more experience is gained with the new contractual setup and some of the ISS
launch constraints have been resolved.
Recommendation 22.
NASA should ensure that all enhancements and upgrades are fully tested and
assessed prior to implementation. Funding profiles and schedule pressures should
not be allowed to shorten any critical testing or validation processes.
iNTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is being downsized
as part of overall government efforts to reduce costs. Part of NASA's response to
reduced budgets has been a restructuring of the Space Shuttle program and the
transfer of much of its operational responsibility to a single prime contractor under
the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). At the same time, efforts on the
International Space Station (ISS) are reaching critical milestones with the first
element launch scheduled for little more than a year in the future.
The International Space Station assembly is scheduled to begin in December 1997
and with it the potential fi)r an increase in the yearly number of Space
Shuttle launches and required supporting operations. Nevertheless, the NASA
Administrator has accepted the challenge of reducing the overall costs of operating
the agency. Space Shuttle operations expenditures in recent years have been
reduced by more than 30 percent through the efficient use of internal changes and
elimination of overhead, but even these savings will not be enough in light of
increasing demands on the Space Shuttle manifest and the reduction in available
funding. As a result of recommendations by various external committees and inter-
nal reviews, the NASA Administrator elected to turn a major portion of the
day-to-day Space Shuttle operations over to a private contractor through the
implementation of a Space Flight Operations Contract.
On August 21,1995, NASA briefed the aerospace industry on a proposal to restruc-
ture existing Space Shuttle operations contract efforts under a single prime contractor.
During September 1995, NASA evaluated submittals from four potential contrac-
tors. On November 7, 1995, the NASA Administrator stated that the agency
would pursue an agreement with United Space Alliance (USA) to become the
single prime contractor for Space Shuttle operations. Rockwell International's
Space Operations Contract and Lockheed Martin's Shuttle Processing Contract
were novated, thereby establishing USA as the "single prime contractor" and
allowing for an early start of operations. On September 30, 1996, USA and NASA
signed a final contract designating USA as the single prime contractor for Space
Shuttle operations. Under the SFOC, USA has responsibility for the day-to-day
Orbiter, pre-launch, flight and ground operations and logistics support. NASA will
continue to have the final launch "go/no-go" decision and ultimate responsibility
for Space Shuttle safety.
The SFOC initiates a new era in the management of the Space Shuttle program,
one that fundamentally reshapes the government/contractor relationship and the
responsibilities for Space Shuttle hardware acquisition, pre-launch processing,
launch and landing operations and flight executions. The successful execution of
the contract is pivotal to the continuation of America's space effort.
In light of the rapid changes taking place within the federal government and
NASA in particular, the White House, through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, requested the NASA Administrator to charge the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) with the responsibility to conduct a review of the
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10 issues associated with the transition to the SFOC and the implications arising from
a reduced budget and smaller work force. This is the Panel's report in response to
the request structured in accordance with the Terms of Reference (Appendix A).
APPROACH
As listed in the Terms of Reference, the review was to focus on potentially significant
safety impacts of the:
• Implementation plan for the transition of Shuttle program management to
the Lead Center
• Transition plan for downsizing to anticipated workforce levels
• Implementation of a phased transition to a prime contractor for operations
• Planned safety and performance upgrades for Space Station assembly
• Maintenance of independent safety oversight
• Shuttle flight rate for Space Station assembly
• Communications among NASA Centers and Headquarters
The scope of the study was delimited to those areas associated with the Space
Shuttle or its support of the assembly of the ISS.
To meet the stated objectives the Panel:
(1) Received briefings from the appropriate members of each organization
affected by the transition to SFOC.
(2) Organized into five teams based on the seven items listed above from the
Terms of Reference:
a) Independence of Safety
b) Lead Center/Communications
c) Downsizing
d) Space Flight Operations Contract
e) Manifest/Shuttle Enhancements
(3) Conducted interviews and discussions with senior management of both
NASA and its contractors
(4) Identified potential safety impacts and issues
(5) Formed consensus recommendations and offered other guidance as appropriate.
Thebalanceof thisreportpresentsobservationsandrecommendationsorganized
bythefocalareasdetailedon thepreviouspage.Eachfocusareaispresentedasa
separatechapterwith observationsandrecommendations;however,the recom-
mendationshavebeennumberedsequentiallythroughouthereport.AppendixB
containsadetailedlist of theactivitiesconductedin supportof thisreview.This
Appendixalsoidentifiespresentersandinterviewees.AppendixCcontainsbiogra-
phiesof theASAPmembersandconsultants.
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MAINTENANCEOFINDEPENDENTSAFETYOVERSIGHT
The scope in the study Terms of Reference includes an examination of the potential
safety impacts of the state of independent safety oversight after the planned consoli-
dation of Space Shuttle operations under a single Space Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC), downsizing of the Space Shuttle workforce and reductions in budgets. This
was interpreted by the study team from the Panel as encompassing three related topics:
(1) the degree to which the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) functions
are organizationally independent of the line functions related to preparing
and launching the Space Shuttles;
(2) the extent to which an independent reporting path for potential problems
will exist after the transitions have been completed; and
(3) the degree of independent assessment provided for in the new organizational
structure and operating plans.
Operations Before the SFOC
The issue of the independence of the safety and quality functions in aerospace has
long been debated. On one side, there are those who argue that safety and quality
can only be assured if the personnel performing these functions do not report to the
"production" organization. The logic is that by placing S&MA in a staff role, it will
be protected from at least the schedule pressures imposed on a line organization. It
also has been reasoned that arranging for the performance reviews of S&MA staffs
to take place outside of the operating program they are assessing removes a major
impediment to critical appraisals.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the independence of the S&MA func-
tion is of less consequence than its prominence and importance within a program.
Following this reasoning, if sufficient resources are allocated to S&MA, it is staffed
with qualified and motivated people and the appropriate value is placed on safety
by the program, organizational and reporting independence are not necessary.
With respect to the operation of the Space Shuttle, the Report of the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident ("Rogers Commission") took a
strong position in faw)r of the independence of S&MA within the Space Shuttle
Program. _The Rogers Commission recommended:
NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality
Assurance [now renamed the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance]
to be headed by an Associate Administrator, reporting directly to the
NASA Administrator. It would have direct authority for safety, reliability
and quality assurance throughout the agency. The office should be assigned
the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its functions and should be
independent of other NASA functional and program responsibilities."
13
_%
_4
)
IRep, ra of the I residential C_,nmissi_,n _m the Spewe Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986, finding 2, page ! (, 1.
:Rep_rrt to the I resident.--Actions t_ Implement the Rec_m_men&_ti_ms _f the Presidential C<,mnissi_m _m the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, July 14,1986, Rec_,nme_ti_m IV, page 20.
14 NASA responded by forming such an office to deal with agency-wide S&MA
policies and issues.
The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has played a role in all
three aspects of independence described above for the Space Shuttle program.
Through policy-setting, it has established that NASA S&MA personnel at the
Centers and Headquarters report to the Lead Center Director, Center Directors or
Headquarters rather than to the Space Shuttle program. The very existence of the
Headquarters S&MA office as well as the operation of the NASA Safety Reporting
System (NSRS) for which it is responsible provides an independent reporting path
concerning safety problems for both NASA and contractor personnel. Finally, in
exercising its responsibility for safety across the agency, OSMA has established inde-
pendent assessment functions to provide additional surveillance of program activities.
Before the transitions which prompted the present study, NASA personnel were
directly involved in all aspects of the operation of the Space Shuttle. NASA
S&MA personnel involved with the Space Shuttle at the space flight centers--
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) and Stennis Space Center (SSC)--were generally in orga-
nizations independent of the program reporting to their Center Directors and
matrixed to the Space Shuttle program. This was not the case, however, with all of
the major Space Shuttle contractors. In particular, the Shuttle Processing
Contractor (SPC), Lockheed Martin, operated with an organizational structure
which had their S&MA organization reporting directly to their operations pro-
gram. Nevertheless, the prevailing management philosophy throughout the gov-
ernment and contractor communities was that anyone involved had the power to
stop a Space Shuttle launch based on safety concerns.
To compensate for the lack of independence of S&MA within the SPC, the S&MA
function of the overall Space Shuttle program had several other sources of safety
independence inherent in the operational structure. Principal among these was the
presence of a NASA employee in most of the critical engineering and technical
operations. These NASA-badged people, whether on the program or S&MA staffs,
worked as a team with their SPC counterparts. These intimate working relationships
exposed both the NASA and SPC staffs to potential problems and issues. If the
NASA and contractor personnel disagreed on a course of action, they had totally
independent management paths through which to elevate the dispute. This arrange-
ment appears to have worked well both because it provided independence and
because of the differing views of Space Shuttle operations which could be adopted
by NASA and the SPC. NASA personnel could take a longer-range, "big picture"
view of any problem with full knowledge that the SPC was addressing the immedi-
ate issues related to any particular Space Shuttle processing flow and launch.
Transition to the SFOC
With the currently planned transition to an SFOC contractor and the downsizing
of the NASA workforce, the S&MA posture will change somewhat. NASA per-
sonnel are being withdrawn from direct, "hands on" engineering, technician and
inspectiondutieson tasksdeemednon-critical.The total responsibilityfor these
taskswill beturnedoverto theSFOCcontractor,UnitedSpaceAlliance(USA).
Inherentin thistransferofresponsibilityisanincreasedrelianceonthecontractor's
S&MA function.NASA ismovingfromwhatit termedasoversight based on gov-
ernment mandatory inspections to a role it characterizes as insight which will be
based more strongly on metrics and periodic surveillance activities than on direct,
day-to-day involvement in the work of preparing and launching Space Shuttles.
The NASA approach will vary slightly across the space flight centers. In general,
however, the plan is for the contractor, USA, to identify problems and characterize
them as "in-family" or "out-of-family." Generally, when a situation has been seen
and successfully resolved before or does not involve a critical safety function ("in-
family"), the SFOC contractor will have complete authority to develop and execute
corrective actions to return the Space Shuttle system to its NASA-generated spec-
ifications ("return to print") without NASA's concurrence. For initial occurrences
of problems and critical safety issues ("out-of-family"), the SFOC contractor must
bring NASA into the deliberation on the cause and corrective action, and NASA
will retain approval authority for all specification and process changes.
At least initially, the SFOC contractor will operate its Space Shuttle processing
activities with respect to S&MA in much the same way as the SPC but without the
presence of a NASA team member for most operations. SFOC contractor safety
and quality inspectors at KSC will continue to report to the vice president who
is associate program manager for ground operations responsible for the successful
processing of the vehicle, but they will typically not have a NASA counterpart
with an independent reporting path. USA has, however, added a corporate level
vice president responsible for Safety and Mission Assurance who reports directly
("hard line") to the USA president and is independent of the operational programs.
This vice president will have a staff of approximately 20 people who will conduct
safety and quality audits, help establish policies with respect to S&MA and handle
incident and accident investigations. The purview of this corporate level S&MA
group will be all of USA's activities which include Space Shuttle processing at
KSC, engineering and mission operations at JSC and sustaining engineering at the
current Rockwell International facility in Downey, California.
USA has established a special toll free telephone number which goes directly to its
corporate S&MA office. This line can be used by anyone in the system for report-
ing problems or concerns. The USA operation at KSC also plans to add additional
USA personnel on critical processing steps from which NASA involvement has
been withdrawn. Currently, NASA intends to maintain a physical presence on the
various work floors and at major contractor facilities even though NASA personnel
may not be directly involved in specific work tasks. This presence is in addition to
periodic audits undertaken as part of NASA's surveillance activities and the exami-
nation of metrics which will be developed and provided by the SFOC contractor.
NASA has also recently established an Independent Assessment (IA) group for the
Space Shuttle at JSC which is part of an overall independent assessment function
for the Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) Enterprise. The
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Space Station (ISS) IA activity which reports directly to the Associate
Administrator-OSMA and has been providing an independent monitoring of
International Space Station safety issues for some time.
Overall, the transition to an SFOC contractor will add at least one additional layer
in the reporting hierarchy. For example, the SPC director of flight operations at
KSC reported to a NASA counterpart at KSC who provided technical direction
and was the designated Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR).
With the SFOC arrangement, the COTR will be at JSC and the former COTR at
KSC becomes a Technical Management Representative (TMR). The role of TMR
involves no official approval authority over technical issues. Thus, the TMR will
have to work through the COTR at JSC to issue contract technical directives.
OBSERVATIONS
An overriding observation which must be considered in assessing the possible
impact of any erosion in safety independence is the sincere and deep rooted desire
of all concerned to maintain the safest possible Space Shuttle operation. This was
clearly evidenced in all of the discussion sessions held and in the extent of the
interest shown by NASA and contractor personnel in ensuring that the Panel was
given access to all relevant materials and people. It is likely that any problems
which may arise will be in spite of the good efforts of all concerned.
The transition to the Space Flight Operations Contract as well as plans for down-
sizing the NASA workforce and reorganizing NASA's program responsibilities
(discussed elsewhere in terms of the Lead Center concept) may have little imme-
diate impact on the processing of the Space Shuttle. From the contractor's
perspective, the same personnel are at work but are simply employed by a new
organization, e.g., USA as the SFOC contractor instead of Lockheed Martin as
SPC. To be sure, there was a period of concern within the workforce fostered by
great uncertainty about the fate of jobs and organizations. Now that the first phase
of transition to the SFOC structure is largely complete, however, much of this
organizationally based concern has dissipated.
From NASA's perspective, there should be sufficient personnel to accomplish on-site
surveillance activities at the space flight centers and contractors for the next few years.
If major additional staff reductions are imposed on NASA in fiscal years 1998 and 1999,
however, the agency's ability to continue on-site surveillance may be compromised.
The change from the SPC to the SFOC contractor will yield no major difference
in S&MA independence from the contractor's perspective. Simply, the SPC did
not have an independent S&MA function and neither does USA under the SFOC.
Also, the NASA Space Shuttle S&MA function, although removed from its day-
to-day operational role, continues to report outside of the program as part of its sur-
veillance and insight activities thereby maintaining independence within the
NASA organizational structure.
Unfi_rtunately,the activitiesof the contractorandNASA viewedseparatelyare
notafull pictureofthe issueof independentsafetyassessmentof heSpaceShuttle.
Fromtheperspectiveofthethreeindependenceissuesdiscussedattheoutsetofthis
section,it canbeobservedthat:
(1) Organizationalindependencehasnotchangedsignificantlyasaresultof the
ongoingchanges.NASA still hasanS&MA organizationwhichis indepen-
dentof its line operations,andthecontractor(USAratherthantheSPC)
doesnot.While the statusquohasbeenmaintainedin this regard,it was
observedbyseveralof thoseinterviewedthatanopportunityto improvethe
situationbyincreasingtheindependenceofthecontractor'sS&MA waslost.
ThePanelconcursin thissentiment.However,changingthestructureof the
programagainatthisjuncturemightgenerateanadditionaldisruptionwhich
wouldbecounterproductive.
(2) The withdrawal of NASA personnel from day-to-day interfaces with their
contractor counterparts will weaken a significant independent reporting path
which is only partially replaced by NASA surveillance activities. Even
though it is currently planned to retain a strong NASA presence on the work
floor and in contractor facilities, some of the team aspect of the NASA/
contractor relationship will surely be lost. This may reduce the likelihood of
contractor personnel utilizing their NASA associates to elevate issues they
are reluctant to raise to their own management. Also, given the long estab-
lished working relationships of most of the current individuals in the NASA
and contractor management positions, the extra layer of management
imposed by the SFOC structure should not represent an impediment
to accurate or timely reporting. A problem could arise, however, with any
successors to the incumbents who may not have the same depth of working
relationship upon which to rely.
(3) The independent assessment functions of both NASA and the contractor have
been broadened. This will provide somewhat increased evaluation of processes
and promulgation of lessons learned but is not intended as a total replacement
for the NASA in-line S&MA activities which have been eliminated.
In the longer range outlook, independence may be further eroded through the loss
of critical skills and experience among NASA personnel. The NASA approach to
insight inherently imposes a requirement that NASA have decision-makers with
direct experience in the operation of the Space Shuttle. These people are currently
available from among the many engineers and quality assurance personnel who
have worked directly on the Space Shuttle program. As time passes and the expe-
rienced people currently in the system retire or leave, their replacements may have
had less opportunity to amass Space Shuttle experience. Even though their tech-
nical skills can be maintained through assignments to other research, technology
and development efforts, the Panel is concerned that the absence of direct Space
Shuttle operational experience will limit their ability to exercise true insight. In
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tion and "apprenticeships" to develop an operational background with the Space
Shuttle will become extremely important.
Given the new structure and the relationship between NASA and USA, the des-
ignated reporting channels between USA personnel and their NASA counterparts
have become more cumbersome since all official actions must go through JSC. This
may inhibit reporting outside of a person's own organization and, hence, reduce the
independence of safety oversight. Initially, this may not be a problem because of the
excellent established relationships between NASA and contractor personnel as a
result of their previous teaming efforts.
Consideration of the issue of succession also leads to the general observation that
NASA should not be misled by the apparent initial success of all of the transition
efforts. Another major test of the robustness of the new approach will likely be faced
after there is significant turnover among incumbents at all levels. It is therefore
important to maintain an adequate level of independent assessment and surveillance
even after it appears that the transitions have been smoothly accomplished.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding observations support the conclusion that independent safety over-
sight may be threatened by the current changes but need not necessarily be severely
compromised if the implications of the changes are understood and properly man-
aged. The following recommendations are offered in order to maintain or improve
the safety oversight function of the Space Shuttle program:
Recommendation 1.
NASA and USA should retain the present S&MA processes with respect to safety
critical operations until surveillance results and the performance of USA as the
SFOC contractor clearly indicate that safety controls, including the maintenance
of realistic independent safety reporting channels, are well established. Thereafter,
sufficient surveillance and independent assessment activities should remain so that
any difficulties arising from subsequent personnel turnover can be identified.
Recommendation 2.
NASA should retain a physical presence on the work floor at the space flight cen-
ters and at all contractors performing safety critical operations. True insight into
safety practices requires personal interfaces and assured access to work in process at
all times. Periodic independent assessment activities, audits and analyses of metrics
are not sufficient to provide the degree of independent safety oversight required to
operate the Space Shuttle program at minimum risk levels in the absence of a
NASA physical presence on the work floor.
Recommendation 3.
NASA should evolve its independent safety oversight efforts into a system in
which it receives notification of all changes, anomalies and recertifications from
the SFOC contractor. These notifications should carry the contractor's assessment
of whethertheyarein- orout-of-family.NASA shouldretainapprovalauthority
for thecontractor'sclassificationof theaction.WhenNASA judgesa changeor
anomalytobecritical,it shouldexercisefinalapprovalauthorityoverthecontrac-
tor'splansandactivities.It isconsideredvital to themaintenanceof independent
safetyoversightthatNASAmaintainthefinaljudgmentrelativeto theapplication
ofthedefinitionof in-andout-of-familyevents.
Recommendation 4.
The long term maintenance of independent safety oversight will require NASA to
develop and implement programs for critical skills retention and for the generation
of direct Space Shuttle operating experience among NASA employees.
Recommendation 5.
NASA should continue its announced policy that "anyone involved can stop a Space
Shuttle launch." Together with the NASA Safety Reporting System, this should help
encourage people to employ the available independent reporting pathways.
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LEADCENTER/COMMUNICATIONS
In early February 1996, the management structure for the Space Shuttle program
was changed to what is referred to as the "Lead Center" approach. This change
elicited statements of concern because this structure had previously been identified
as contributing to the Challenger accident. In what follows, the Lead Center
structure is described. The performance of the Space Shuttle program under this
management arrangement since its adoption, as well as the maintenance of com-
munications among program components, will be assessed.
Definitions
Before addressing these subjects, it is important to define certain relevant Space
Shuttle terms:
• SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM_The sum of all the parts of the Space
Shuttle development and operating organization (that is, all the organizations
and activities responsible for the Projects and Elements of the Space Shuttle).
• PROJECT--The activity and/or management organization of each of the
major components comprising the Space Shuttle. These include: Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM), External Tank (ET), Orbiter, Extra-Vehicular
Activity (EVA), Launch & Landing (L&L) and Logistics.
• ELEMENTS---The activities and/or organizations that provide operational or
other support services fi3r the program. They include: Johnson Space Center
(JSC) Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), JSC Engineering Directorate,
JSC Space and Life Sciences Directorate and the Stennis Space Center (SSC).
Lead Center Concept and History
The essence of the Lead Center type management is the delegation to a single
NASA field center of the overall program management authority for an activity
that involves the participation of other NASA field centers. The concept is not
new to NASA. NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA), managed the research airplane programs in a similar manner.
For example, the X- 15 program was managed by the Langley Research Center with
inputs from the Ames and Lewis Research Centers, while its flight testing was the
responsibility of the Dryden Flight Research Center (formerly the High Speed
Flight Test Center). More recent examples in the NASA era would include the
Lunar Orbiter and Viking programs. Both were managed by Langley with Lewis
managing the launch vehicles (Atlas-Agena and Titan-Centaur, respectively) and
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory operating the Deep Space Tracking Network. In both
cases, the management responsibilities and authorities of the participating organiza-
tions were rigorously detailed in a Program Development Plan written in accordance
with a NASA Management Instruction (NMI) concerning program management.
A key element of the plans was that the responsibility and authority for executing
a field center's role in the program was delegated to the pertinent field center director
who, in turn, would assign the day-to-day conduct of the effort to a senior melnber
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22 of the field center's staff. In the case of the Lead Center, its director appointed the
"project manager" (the equivalent of the current program manager). In like man-
ner, the other center directors would appoint system managers who reported to the
project manager on program and system matters. The center directors, both lead
and participating, exercised technical and managerial oversight of the performance
of their appointees.
The chain of command was quite clear--from system managers to project manager
to a Headquarters program manager to the program Associate Administrator (AA).
The program manager, in concert with the program AA, set the goals, resource
allocations and major schedule milestones and acted as the advocate for the pro-
gram. If a disagreement arose among system managers or between a system manager
and the project manager, the issue was appealed to the field center directors
involved. If agreement could not be reached at that level, the issue was escalated
to the program manager and/or program AA. Such appeals were extremely rare.
The Apollo Program was, however, not managed in the Lead Center mode. There
were sound reasons for this. First and foremost, no single NASA field center was
ready to handle so large a responsibility. The nascent NASA was in the process of
building new field centers to handle manned space programs, and it was concerned
about overwhelming any one field center with too great a workload. Accordingly,
a large management and engineering team was assembled at NASA Headquarters,
and narrower responsibilities were assigned to the three new field centers involved
in the undertaking: the Manned Spacecraft Center (later renamed the Johnson
Space Center) was assigned responsibility for the Apollo Command Module and
Lunar Excursion Module; Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was assigned the
launch vehicle development (Saturn); and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) was
assigned launch operations responsibility.
In addition, because the fledgling organizations were perceived to lack systems
engineering capability and experience, Bellcom was created and placed under con-
tract to NASA Headquarters to provide this function for the Apollo program. This
managerial arrangement worked very well and has frequently been recommended
as a model for subsequent programs of such magnitude. However, this system was
costly and employed a large number of people. Apollo also enjoyed a presidential
mandate "...befi3re this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning
him safely to Earth..." so costs and staffing were secondary considerations. After
completion of Apollo and its follow-on program, Skylab, congressional and inter-
nal NASA pressures were applied to reduce the size of the agency, particularly
NASA Headquarters, and reduce the cost of managing major programs. In the
decade it took to complete Apollo, the three manned space flight centers had been
built and staffed and gained experience such that NASA had developed an in-
house systems engineering capability of its own. For these reasons, the Bellcom
contract was terminated. This was the situation in NASA on the eve of the Space
Shuttle undertaking.
The Space Shuttle program possessed features parallel to those of Apollo: a space-
craft, a launch system and a launch operations site. Thus, it would have been
logicalto employa managementschemesimilar to that adoptedfor Apollo.
However,NASA decidedagainstthisapproachandadoptedaLeadCenterformof
managementwithJSCastheLeadCenter.JSCwasselectedprimarilyfor tworea-
sons:(1) it haddevelopeduringthe Apollo/Skylaberathepeopleandwhere-
withal to conductandmanagecomplexspacecraftoperations;and (2) its staff
containedanucleusof aircraftflight researchengineersfromtheformerNACA
Centersandfromindustry.ThelatterwasimportantastheSpaceShuttleisanair-
craftaswellasaspacecraft.
Themanagementarrangementthat wasadoptedfor theSpaceShuttledevelop-
mentisdescribedinNMI 8020.18A,Space Shuttle Program Management, dated July
12, 1971. This arrangement was essentially that which was in effect throughout the
development period from 1972 to 1983 except that in 1978 the position of program
director at Headquarters was abolished and the duties assumed by the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight.
The same individuals occupied the key managerial positions throughout most of
the development period. They worked well together, knew and respected each
other's capabilities, and followed prescribed lines of authority. This situation was to
change dramatically after the first few development flights were completed.
Changes occurred in the key managerial positions at Headquarters and at the field
centers. Communication channels that previously had provided timely exchanges
of important information were no longer utilized as effectively. In a sense, the sys-
tem went underground and pertinent information that should have been passed
along was withheld for fear of how it might be used.
This state of affairs would prove to be a significant factor in events that led to the
Challenger accident. In fact, it was the concern that this counterproductive situa-
tion would continue that prompted a return to the Apollo-type management struc-
ture after the Challenger accident. This change did not relieve all anxiety because
of the continued rapid successions of Associate Administrators of the Office of
Space Flight (AA-OSF) and program managers in Headquarters and the field cen-
ters. Subsequent policy changes recognizing the need for stability of organization
and implementing personnel led to the recent re-establishment of the Lead Center
style of management for all NASA programs.
Former Space Shuttle Organization
Prior to February 1996, when the change to the Lead Center management approach
was adopted, the management of the Space Shuttle program was centered in NASA
Headquarters (NASA-HQS) under the AA-OSE This office is responsible for the
Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) Enterprise which contains
both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs.
In accordance with NMI 7120.4, Management of Major System Programs and
Projects, dated November 8, 1993, the AA-OSF designated a Deputy AA as pro-
gram director of the Space Shuttle program. This required a significant number of
both technical and business staff members to be located at NASA-HQS. The Space
Shuttle program manager and a deputy program manager were resident at JSC and
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24 KSC, respectively, but "badged" to NASA-HQS. That is, they were Headquarters
employees reporting to the program director. They were, in fact, tenants at the field
centers, the latter being designated "Host Field Installations." These program man-
agers were subject to detailed day-to-day direction and oversight from the program
director, and major decisions were the purview of the Deputy AA/program director.
The field centers inw_lved were required to "support" these managers with
personnel, institutional and technical resources. But, the field center directors
had no authority over how these resources were employed other than the
appointment of the project managers in consultation with the program manager
and program director. The field center directors were, effectively, "out-of-the-
loop" in the management of a program and its project(s) located at their centers
although they were responsible for "oversight" of the performance of the personnel
assigned to the projects as well as the overall management of their centers.
The various project managers of the Space Shuttle program located at the field
centers noted above and the staffs of the project offices and any support they drew
from field center organizations, reported their Space Shuttle activities directly to
the Space Shuttle program manager. The performance evaluations of the project
managers were, however, the responsibility of the pertinent field center director or
a designee.
It may be concluded that the implementation of the Space Shuttle program under
the management structure described above contained some incongruities that could
result in uncertainties and irritations among the major players. In most corporate
organizational structures, corporate headquarters sets policy, defines objectives and
allocates resources. Implementation of programs is assigned to an operating division
whose leader is given full responsibility and authority to accomplish the program. If
the assigned operating division needs an assist from another division, the lead divi-
sion (with corporate approval) negotiates a "contract" with the other division for a
discrete task and gives them full authority and responsibility to accomphsh the
assignment. Such clean lines of authority and responsibility aw_id the pitfalls that
were present in this former Space Shuttle management structure.
Current Organization
The management of the total Space Shuttle program is now distributed among
NASA Headquarters and four field centers. JSC has been designated the Lead
Center. In addition to its role as the program management center, it provides pro-
ject management for the Orbiter. It also provides element management fi_r: mission
operations (JSC-MOD), engineering (JSC Engineering Directorate), Extra
Vehicular Activity and logistics.
MSFC provides project management for fimr major Space Shuttle components.
These are organized into the Shuttle Projects Office which is composed of the
SSME, SRB, RSRM and ET projects. The Shuttle Projects Office provides program
integration of these activities and serves as a major single point of contact with the
program office at JSC. The head of the Shuttle Projects Office is a member of the
program office and, hence, a JSC employee located at MSFC.
KSCprovidesmanagementofthe launchandlandingandoflogistics.TheStennis
SpaceCenterprovidesmanagementof theSSMEtestelement.
Asin theclassicLeadCenterarrangement,theseveralfieldcenterdirectorsarein-
linefortherolesassignedtotheirorganizations.Theyalsoparticipateinwhatmight
becalledthe "boardof directors"for the program,the LeadCenterDirector's
ProgramManagementCouncil(PMC),comprisingallthefieldcenterdirectorsand
the programmanager.At PMCmeetings,the statusandprogressof the Space
Shuttleprogramareassessed,andmajorissuesarediscussedandresolved.
OBSERVATIONS
ThePanelreceivedpresentationsfromHEDSofficialsandtheAA of theOfficeof
SafetyandMissionAssuranceat NASA Headquarterson thestateof theSpace
ShuttleprogramandtheirviewsontheLeadCenterorganizationalmode.Toascer-
tainhowtheLeadCenterstructurewasworking,thefieldcenterdirectorsinvolved
in theSpaceShuttleprogram,theprogrammanagerandtheprojectmanagersand
someoftheirdeputieswereinterviewed.Also,documentationpertinentothesub-
jectwasreviewed.Fromtheseactivities,theobservationswhichfollowweremade.
The LeadCentermanagementmodefor theSpaceShuttleisworkingverywell
underthe leadershipof theexistingcenterdirectorsandmanagers.Todate,all the
projectandelementmanagersappeargenerallysatisfiedwith thearrangementand
areactiveparticipantsin it. Muchof the satisfactionwith the systemof those
involvedat theselevelsandamongtheirsubordinatescanbeattributedto thefact
that theyhavebeenworkingtogetheron thisprogramforoveradecadeandhave
cometo know,respectandtrustoneanother.
Formalcommunicationsamongthecentersareaccomplishedvia theLeadCenter
Director'sProgramManagementCouncil.Inter-center communications to develop
and manage budgets, schedules and technical requirements are accomplished using
both formal and informal means. The Safety and Mission Assurance organizations
participate in all program forums. Among the formal program-level communica-
tions mechanisms are:
The daily "Standup" meeting attended by project managers and program
element managers in person or via a telephone conference call. Subjects
discussed cover both technical and schedule issues.
Daily Program Requirements Change Board (PRCB) telephone conferences
chaired by the Manager, Launch Integration at which reports on vehicle pro-
cessing status and issues are aired and changes required to configuration and
other controlling documents are dispositioned by representatives of relevant
program sites and contractors.
Weekly PRCB meeting, a telephone conference call chaired by the program
manager inw_lving all program sites and contractors. This PRCB acts to
consider and disposition proposals involving program budgets, schedules and
technical changes.
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reviews chaired by the program manager dealing with financial, technical and
metrics issues. Some are conducted via telecon and others in person at venues that
rotate among the centers.
Upward communications are effected via the NASA Management Council and the
HEDS Management Council attended by all field center directors involved in the
Space Shuttle program. In addition, for more timely communication, representa-
tives of the NASA Headquarters staff offices participate in the daily "Standup"
meeting as well as the PRCBs and the Lead Center Director's Program
Management Council.
In summary, a multiplicity of formal communications channels exist and are used
for transmitting information both upward and downward in the program. In addi-
tion, informal horizontal communications are encouraged keeping counterparts
and other interacting individuals among the several organizations in daily contact
about events and issues of mutual interest.
The field center directors involved are generally satisfied with their roles under the
Lead Center mode. Their ability to quickly deploy their center's personnel and
physical resources against emerging problems is especially appreciated as is the fact
that they are now in-line in the program. Some of them, however, are concerned
about the impact of the implementation of "full cost accounting" for all program
activities. In particular, the concern is not about accounting for all the charges and
hours used on the program (they do that now) but over the apparent need for bud-
get re-programming before they can take any necessary actions.
Some of the managers expressed a concern about the possibility of the Lead Center
receiving preferential budget allocations. It should be noted that those expressing
concern observed that nothing of this nature has occurred to date--but they would
still prefer to have a "neutral" party make the allocations.
Another concern was also raised about the degree of control that is to be exercised
by the program manager over budget resources that have been allocated to a project
or element. As it is currently understood, should a situation arise in which one of
the managers determined that a shift of the funds within the allocation received was
required, that manager would have to apply to the program manager for authoriza-
tion to do so--despite the fact that it would require no additional funds. Although
it would provide the program manager with immediate knowledge of what is going
on, such a restriction of a manager's authority could be construed to reflect a lack of
trust and might constitute an impediment to timely execution of a program.
As yet, those documents that are the formal mechanisms for establishing and
describing the Lead Center mode of management have not been issued. It is under-
stood that there are teams working on the development of such documents.
Without these documents to specify the format and content required for delega-
tions and inter-organizational agreements, it is not possible to have a common
understanding of the "rules of the game." It would also be desirable to infuse these
documents with counsel from senior individuals within the agency who have prior
experiencein workingunderthe LeadCentermodesothat thedocumentscan
includeprovisionsthat will precludeproblemsthat havebeenexperiencedin the
past.This isof particularimportanceformatterslike thescopeof authorityof all
levelsof managerswhichshouldbesodefinedasto avoidmicro-management.
A matterof someconcernamongprojectandelementmanagersi the impactof
theSpaceFlightOperationsContract(SFOC)ontherolesandresponsibilitiesof
theseveralprojects.AlthoughformanyprojectsSFOCeffectsmaynot befeltfor
sometime,thereisanobviousneedfor near-termassessmentof the issuesothat
provisionscanbemadeto aw_idpotentialpitfalls.
Themanagersoftheprojectsandelementsare,forthemostpart,long-termNASA
employees.Many of them areapproachingthe agefor voluntaryretirement.
Althoughin mostcasesthisisatleastfiveyearsin thefuture,it wasagreedbythose
interviewedthat it wasnot too soonto takestepsto assurewell-trainedand
suitablyexperiencedreplacementsfor the incumbents.This is vital for sucha
multi-facetedprogramwhichisexpectedto lastfor adecadeormore.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 6.
The development of the governing documents for the Lead Center mode of pro-
gram management should be expedited. Particular attention should be given to
assure that the resulting documents establish clear and unambiguous definitions of
the scope of responsibilities and authorities of all levels of management within a
program. Provisions should be incorporated to preclude the possibility of micro-
management. Acknowledgment should be given to the importance of mutual
respect and trust among the managers for the success of this (and any other) mode
of management of complex programs.
Recommendation 7.
There should be a high level, internal, periodic review of the Lead Center man-
agement structure and its operations. This review should examine whether the
concept is functioning as intended.
Recommendation 8.
Measures should be taken to assure that individuals ascending to positions of
authority within the program are properly trained in the Lead Center philosophy
so that deviations in management operations will not occur.
27

3
DOWNSIZlNG
NASA is approximately halfway through a planned reduction of 8,000 civil ser-
vants, cutting employment from 25,500 full time equivalent (FTE) employees in
the early 1990s to 17,500 FTEs in fiscal year (FY) 2000. It is generally agreed that
voluntary attrition will not achieve the full 4,000 reduction that remains, and that
an involuntary Reduction in Force (RIF) will be needed, probably in FY 98/99.
These lower personnel levels refect the sharp budget reductions that have been
projected for FY 00, reducing NASA's FY 96 budget of $13.8 billion to $11.6 bil-
lion plus inflation. Whether reductions of this magnitude will be sustained in the
outyears remains to be seen.
Since FY 91, Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC),
and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have reduced their civil service employees by
approximately 15 percent. In this same period, the Shuttle Processing Contractor
(SPC) achieved a 30 percent cut (2,500 persons). Both NASA and the SPC relied
heavily on buyout authority or incentivized layoffs to gain approximately one-half of
their respective departures with normal attrition accounting for most of the rest. The
SPC used inw_luntary layoffs to achieve 21 percent of its reduction. NASA did not
use an involuntary RIE Managers at JSC, MSFC, KSC, and United Space Alliance
(USA) all stressed that these earlier cuts took care of the obvious or "easy" reductions.
At JSC, the civil service headcount is to decline an additional 602 FTEs (3,470 in
FY 96 to 2,868 in FY 00). At MSFC, the reduction is projected to be 650 (3,138 in
FY 96 to 2,488 in FY 00). At KSC, the reduction is projected to be 821 (2,266 in
FY 96 to 1,445 in FY 00))
Outyear personnel levels for USA are still being negotiated with NASA; however,
the cuts will likely fall between 1,170 and 1,860 (9,400 today to 8,230, as proposed
by USA, or 7,540, as proposed by NASA, in FY 00). 4
These general totals do not reveal potential shortfalls in specific functional areas
(e.g., Safety and Mission Assurance at KSC will lose 40 percent of its civil service
employees and 100 percent of its contractor support personnel by FY 00) or the
skills and experience mix among the remaining employees.
OBSERVATIONS
It is clear that the projected "downsizing" at NASA represents a significant
management challenge and a potential safety concern as the agency shifts program
management from Headquarters to field centers and implements the Space Flight
Operations Contract (SFOC) for managing the Space Shuttle.
The downsizing plans raise four separate but closely related questions:
(1) Are the projected personnel levels in the FY 99/00 timeframe at NASA and
the United Space Alliance (USA) acceptable in terms of maintaining safety?
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Estimates _f current and pr,_jected pers.nnel /etv/s at the field cen_ers fluctuate acc_,rdinv t_, the .s_urce being _tsed; it is
impossible t. fiT_l universal agreement am_,ng vari_us sources _m any given number. The numbers used hew were lm,vided by_
NASA HeaJqz_rters in the d*_:ument NASA W, rrkfi,rce Streamlining Metrics, FY 1993 t,, FY 20tX_, as .'f July 6, 1996.
These numbers excll,.de 1,365 lwrs,mnel at Rockwell International, Downey, CA,
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(3)
(4)
Do NASA and USA have the appropriate skills and experience mix to main-
tain acceptable safety levels during this period of downsizing?
What management tools and incentives are needed to achieve the projected
personnel levels during this period while still maintaining the requisite skills
and experience mix?
Will the downsizing process itself become a significant disruption and obstacle
to successfid Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) operations?
Although JSC, MSFC and KSC will all be hard pressed to meet outyear person-
nel targets without an involuntary R1F and its attendant disruption, the circum-
stances that confront NASA management and employees at KSC are particularly
difficult. Indeed, a top management representative at Headquarters and one at
KSC separately and independently observed that the KSC downsizing situation
was "the most difficult management challenge I've encountered in my 30-year
career at NASA."
Johnson Space Center
Aggressive use of the federal buyout package in FY 94/95 reduced center employ-
ment by 15 percent to approximately 3,350 employees today. Few key people were
lost. No involuntary RIFs were needed. However, w_luntary attrition today is
extremely low, and there is little expectation that remaining cuts can be achieved
without a RIF in FY 98/99. The current hiring freeze has all but stopped intake of
new employees: 10 critical hires last year, about one dozen co-op students, and a
new class of astronauts. If, as JSC management believes, a RIF will be needed to
reach the 602 additional reductions by FY 00, it is reasonable to assume that
younger engineers in greater numbers will begin looking for and accepting non-
NASA employment as soon as the RIF process starts. In time, this will more than
likely lead to an undesirable mix of skills and experience in the JSC workforce.
Figure 3-1, JSC Workforce vs. Program & RIF Milestones, illustrates the conjunction
among JSC's reduced personnel levels, program milestones, and the effective dates
of civil service RIF procedures. RIF'ed employees will leave JSC during the period
of intense activity associated with preparations tbr launch of the initial ISS
elements. Moreover, RIF procedures are highly disruptive to the majority of the
workforce, even to those not likely to be RIF'ed. Morale is bound to suffer.
Expiration of the buyout authority last year caused JSC management to devise
innovative w)luntary, non-monetary incentives to encourage departures among retire-
ment-eligible employees. Called Career Plus, these incentives consist of the following:
• Trial Retirement. Participants "try out" retirement for 12-18 months. JSC will
rehire them if retirement does not work out.
• Phased Retirement. Participants retire and are rehired to perfi_rm JSC work on
a part-time basis not to exceed 1,020 hours per year for up to 2 years.
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32 Partners in Education. Helps employees transition to teaching positions at
educational institutions. Participants retire and are hired to teach in high
schools, community colleges, or universities.
Partners in Technology. Helps retirees transfer NASA technology to the pri-
vate sector and enables them to use the services of a technology incubator to
develop and market the technology.
These non-monetary incentive packages are designed to make retirement more
attractive by providing a phased transition to new careers or by reducing the per-
sonal risk if retirement is unsatisfactory. In place fi_r less than a year at JSC, Career
Plus has produced an estimated 16 Trial Retirements, 8 Phased Retirements and no
retirements under the education or technology options. Fifty other JSC employees
are considering the Career Plus option.
Career Plus, taken alone, will not make it possible to avoid a RIF in FY 98/99.
However, if Career Plus were to be linked with the current buyout package (an
action that will require legislative approval of the linkage}, a R1F could more than
likely be aw_ided. In addition, JSC, as a development center, has a wider range of
employment options to offer younger employees whose slots are eliminated,
especially if a combined buyout/career incentive package opens up advancement
opportunities for mid-career employees.
It appears likely that JSC can achieve its projected employment levels and avoid
serious disruption to its civil service workfi_rce through an involuntary RIF if the
buyout package which has recently been made available is linked to Career Plus
options. At this point, JSC management has not identified any functional areas
likely to suffer critical losses by FY 00 if the further reductions can be managed pos-
itively through a buyout and associated initiatives. To aw_id a growing disparity of
skills and experience in the post 2000 period, authority for selective hires needs to
be restored in conjunction with the current buyout.
Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Space Flight Center faces a situation very similar to its sister development
center, JSC. Approximately 700 employees ( 15 percent} have already been reduced
since 1991. The buyouts in FY 94/95 accounted fi_r more than 500 of these depar-
tures. Currently, more than 800 employees are eligible for retirement, but voluntary
attrition and interest in Career Plus-type plans have been very low as employees
waited fi_r the present buyout program to be approved.
At present, the workforce is well balanced in terms of skills and experience. A "new
skills handbook" has been prepared that identifies in detail 240 "skill categories"
that will be needed at the targeted employment levels to carry out MSFC's respon-
sibilities. If the current buyout package proves attractive, management believes a
balanced workfi)rce can be maintained at the targeted levels, and all planned
responsibilities can be carried out without any compromise to safety.
Thepercentageof ScienceandEngineering(S&E)personnelat MSFCissched-
uledto increase.A newhighlyautomatedEdTechcenterhasbeenopenedto
providecross-trainingin keydisciplines.Mentoringrelationshipswith younger
employeesarebeingencouraged.Thereisapositiveandproactiveprogramto pre-
pareMSFCfor theloweremploymentlevelsthatareprojected.
Thisyear,10co-opstudentswereconvertedto MSFCemployees.Otherwisethere
havebeenno newhires.Managementbelieveslimitedhiringauthoritywill be
neededto sustainawellbalancedworkforcein thepost-2000period.
MSFCshouldbeableto reshapeitsworkforceto carryoutitsprogrammaticrespon-
sibilitiesand maintainacceptablesafetylevelsif the buyoutprovisionis well
receivedbyemployees.Therepresentlyaremoreretirementeligibleemployeesat
MSFCthantheprojectednumberof additionalreductionsneeded.However,if an
inw)luntaryRIFisneededin FY98/99,it will morethanlikelyproduceanunsatis-
factorymix of skillsandexperiencealongwith the expectedhumanproblems.
Limitedauthorityfor newhiresshouldbeauthorizedin orderto sustainanorderly
influxof youngertalentin thepost-2000period.
KennedySpaceCenter
KSCispresentlybeingcalledon to reduceitsworkforceby821FTEsbyFY00.In
additionto this relativelylargenet reduction,KSCfacesseveralproblemsthat
makeit harderto managetheprojectedcutsin apositiveway:
As an"operations"center,KSChasfewerjob categoriesandpositionsinto
whichemployeescanbemovedif theircurrentjob iseliminated.
Manyof KSC'straditionaloccupationsarechangingor beingeliminated
undertheSpaceFlightOperationsContract.
KSC'sinstitutionalfuturein the postFY00periodisnot clear,makingit
nearlyimpossibleto devisea coherentpersonnelstrategyfor either civil
serviceorSFOCcontractoremployees.
KSCisthelaststopbeforedeploymentoftheISS,andproblemsarelikelyto
accumulatethereduringlaunchpreparations.
In viewof theseproblems,KSCmanagementfacesadilemma.On theonehand,if
aRIFwerecertainin FY98/99,it wouldmakemoresenseto getit overasquickly
aspossibleinorderto avoidtheadditionaldisruptionsthat will takeplaceduring
theintenseperiodof initial launchesassociatedwith theISS.On theotherhand,
theNASA Administratorhaspointedout thatit wouldnotbefair toputemploy-
eesthroughthetrialsof theRIFprocessinorderto achievestaffinglevelsbasedon
projectionsthatarenothardandfast.
FurthercomplicatingKSC'ssituation,asnotedabove,is thetransitionofresponsi-
bilitiesfromNASA to theSFOCcontractorin ahostofareas.NASA'sskilledand
experiencedworkforceiscurrentlyneededto accomplishthis transitionsuccess-
fullywhilemaintainingsafety.Asjobsfi_rthesepeopleareeliminatedor transferred
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34 to the contractor, it would be desirable to shift the NASA employees, especially
engineers, into new assignments. Yet, there are few such opportunities at KSC. To
help address this problem, the center directors at KSC and JSC are collaborating in
shifting development work associated with Space Shuttle upgrades to KSC. In
addition, JSC has organized teams of KSC personnel to work with manufacturers of
ISS hardware to help ensure its suitability fi_r subsequent processing at KSC.
Unlike JSC and MSFC, the current buyout, by itself, will not resolve these inter-
woven problems at KSC. The scope of the cuts are sufficiently large, coupled with
the center's continuing responsibilities in the transition to the SFOC, that while a
buyout will likely reduce the loss of younger employees, it will also accelerate the
departure of senior employees who are needed in this transition period. An imbal-
ance of skills and experience will likely result. However, an involuntary RIF will
make these problems even more difficult to resolve. The buyout is a necessary, but
not sufficient answer to KSC's downsizing problems.
As KSC's center director recently pointed out in a memorandum regarding his out-
year civil service ceilings, an involuntary RIF of 547 people will be required on
October 1, 1998, to reach 1,445 FTEs, KSC's current outyear target. A reduction
of this magnitude will halt further work by KSC on Space Shuttle upgrades and
launch processing system modernization among a number of other impacts. _ In the
same memorandum, the center director also pointed out that:
After FY 98, KSC's core engineering skills, technical expertise and development
capabilities in mechanical, automation, and checkout control and data communi-
cations systems are seriously eroded.
* Insight into institutional contractor S&MA activities is not sustainable.
This erosion of KSC's skills and experience mix is already evident. During FY 96,
KSC has separated 95 persons; 68 were from Science and Engineering (S&E), the
largest loss of any occupational category. Moreover, 26 persons came from Space
Shuttle processing (the largest loss by organization) and 10 from Safety and
Mission Assurance. Of the 95 separations, 36 were persons in the 21-30 age range
(the largest loss by age group) and 25 in the 31-40 age group. Figure 3-2, Shuttle
Processing_urrent Age Distribution, illustrates for Space Shuttle processing the
concentration of engineering losses in the 27-36 age range, persons who would nor-
mally assume major responsibilities by FY 00 and beyond. Figure 3-3, Center Losses
by Skill Group, illustrates a similar trend in earlier fiscal years, with S&E absorbing
the largest percentage losses at KSC. These S&E losses are not being replaced with
new engineering talent due to the hiring freeze that has been in effect. Figure 3-4,
Shuttle Processing--Engineering Co-op Conversions, illustrates that KSC's strong
record of converting engineering co-op students into NASA employees ceased in
FY 96 with zero hires (compared, for example, with 16 hires in FY 93).
_Honeycum Jay F. Memorandum _, NASA Headq_mrters (Arm: M-I/Deputy Ass_ciate Administrator fi_r Sl×_:e FLighO
dated Au,_st 7, 1996.
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Figure3-3
Center Lossesby Skill Group
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38 The root cause of KSC's dilemma can be traced to the earlier planned strategy,
now abandoned, to transform the center to a Government Owned/Contractor
Operated (GOCO) type operation. As KSC's center director pointed out in the
same August 7, 1996, memorandum referenced earlier:
The Zero Base Review assumed that the Center would transition to a
"GOCO-/ike" operation and the resulting Center operations FTE
requirement was based on that assumption. Although that assumption was
abandoned and the need for increased Shuttle and Space Station resources
was recognized, the FTE reduction in Center Support has not changed.
Not surprisingly, the resulting impact erodes KSC's institutional capability to sus-
tain skills and expertise needed to provide meaningful "insight" into the operations
of the SFOC and maintain key facilities and facility systems.
The important questions that remain unanswered are: What is KSC's institutional
future? How much responsibility will NASA civil servants have in the future? As a
GOCO, this responsibility would be minimal and the present personnel targets
could be accommodated. But, if KSC is expected to provide continuing "insight"
into the operations of the SFOC contractor, participate in Space Shuttle upgrades
and ISS preparations as well as sustain KSC's institutional technical resources, it
must maintain a skilled and experienced civil service workforce. Under present
circumstances, this will be virtually impossible to accomplish given the magnitude
of future cuts and the difficulty of maintaining needed skills and experience with
these reduced numbers.
The coming crisis in downsizing KSC is generally recognized. Given the severe
budgetary constraints facing NASA in FY 00 and beyond, positive action to resolve
the problem has not occurred. Thus, NASA finds itself in the posture of going
along with the situation in the short run (FY 97/98) in full knowledge that such
action may worsen the severity of the actions that will be needed in FY 98/99, the
period of initial ISS launches.
In response to the KSC center director's memorandum of August 7, 1996, the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight wrote that :
We" wiU Jbcus on these out-years and adjust your FTE targets to meet
aplm_priate safety requirements. Again, safety will not be compromised.
I am committed to assuring that key positions will be fully staffed, now
and in the future3
KSC faces a management challenge of major dimensions if it is to maintain a work-
force of sufficient size, skills, and experience to achieve acceptable levels of safety
in Space Shuttle and International Space Station operations. Until a decision is
made regarding KSC's future in the post-2000 period, it is all but impossible to
design a personnel strategy that will:
• Avoid serious disruptions during the period of intense launch activity associ-
ated with the ISS;
_'Trafi<,n, _.gqlbur C. Mem_,randum ( ]D/l)irector, John F. Kenned'_ Space ('.enter (KS(;) dated September 5, 1996.
Work effectively with USA during the transition to the SFOC; and
Retain a desirable mix of skills and experience.
Moreover, additional flexibility in current personnel ceilings, keyed to actual
reductions in the scope of work being performed, will be needed in the post-2000
period in order to maintain adequate institutional technical resources.
Buyout Provisions
NASA top management had previously explored with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and the Congress an enhanced buyout provision that would
have provided between 50 percent and 80 percent of current salary to NASA per-
sonnel who were eligible for retirement, but this version was rejected. Amounts of
$50,000 and $35,000 were also explored and rejected. Instead, the earlier buyout
incentive of $25,000 was renewed. The renewed buyout authority should provide
some flexibility in sustaining an acceptable skills and experience mix. After taxes,
this amounts to about $18,000 in take-home pay and, by itself, may not be suffi-
cient to attract many employees who can earn a comparable amount of compensa-
tion in several months or less by continuing their employment.
It has been reported to the Panel that:
• A buyout provision that attracts voluntary retirements from among NASA's
top civil service managers will save approximately $20,000 per person annually.
• Retirements from among employees of average grade level will produce no
annual savings.
• By the time all personnel costs and staff time are added, an involuntary RIF
will cost NASA approximately $40,000 for each person who is separated.
• In addition to the budgetary savings that flow from an attractive buyout
along with the avoided costs of a RIF, the larger number of voluntary retire-
ments will make it much easier to maintain a desirable skills mix and lower
the median age of NASA employees. A new, younger NASA positioned to
deal with post-2000 challenges will result. This must be compared to the
likely result of an involuntary RIF that separates or drives away the same
cadre of younger employees.
Linking the current buyout to three of the Career Plus-type options--Phased
Retirements, Partners in Education, and Partners in Technology--will improve the
attractiveness of the $25,000 amount as well as keeping experienced NASA employ-
ees available for part-time work. However, this combination will require a legislative
change to permit persons who accept any buyout to have the opportunity to continue
part-time NASA employment. This approach would provide NASA the flexibility
needed to attempt to reach targeted personnel cuts during this period of intense activ-
ity and transition while maintaining an appropriate balance of skills and experience.
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40 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 9.
NASA workforce downsizing should be preceded by successful reductions in work
requirements to ensure that arbitrary employment targets do not adversely affect
the safety of Space Shuttle and International Space Station operations. Field cen-
ters, especially the Kennedy Space Center, should be given latitude and flexibility
in achieving scope of work reductions and revising targeted personnel levels as the
work content changes.
Recommendation 10.
NASA should renew its appeal to OMB and the Congress to gain approval of an
enhanced buyout provision of at least $50,000. The Congress is urged to consider
the request faw_rably. Using the flexibility achieved through an attractive buyout
package, NASA should be permitted to resume limited hiring of younger engi-
neering and scientific personnel. An enhanced buyout provision would be an
important tool to help avoid a disruptive invohmtary Reduction in Force (RIF)
along with the distortions in skills and experience that will likely be a direct by-
product of a RIE
Recommendation 11.
NASA should seek legislative approval to combine its buyout authority, regard-
less of amount, with the phased retirement, Partners in Education, and Partners in
Technology provisions of the Career Plus program. This approach will enhance the
attractiveness of any buyout package and keep available for part-time work some
of NASA's most knowledgeable employees during this period of intense activity
and transition.
Recommendation 12.
The institutional and functional role of the Kennedy Space Center in the post-
2000 period should be defined, and a personnel strategy for KSC and the SFOC
contractor that is appropriate to that role should be devised. A prompt decision
on this issue will also be of considerable value to USA as it implements the terms
of the SFOC.
Recommendation 13.
NASA should continue to develop alternative employment opportunities, such as
those associated with Space Shuttle upgrades and ISS integration, for KSC employees
who otherwise would leave to aw)id a RIF or who would be inw)luntarily separated
through a RIE
4
SPACEFLIGHTOPERATIONSCONTRACT
In order to reduce costs through efficiencies believed to be inherent in the private
sector and reorient NASA's focus from operations to research, development and
technology, NASA has implemented a plan for privatizing space flight operations
for the Space Shuttle. The first phase of that plan is a consolidation of a majority
of Space Shuttle processing support contractors into a single Space Flight
Operations Contract (SFOC) negotiated with United Space Alliance (USA).
Concurrently, several of the Space Shuttle processing activities formerly performed
by government employees are in the process of being assumed by USA. Because
such changes are a major departure from all previous human space flight operations,
there could well be safety implications.
A team of Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel members and consultants participated
in briefings and conversations at NASA Headquarters, the Johnson Space Center
(JSC), the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), the Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) and at the USA corporate headquarters. The team also benefited from
discussions and shared memoranda with members of other Panel study teams; how-
ever, the principal effort was a careful review of the documentation available:
* Amendment 3 to the government Request for Proposal for the SFOC;
Revision A (July 30, 1996) to the SFOC contractor's Program Management
Plan; and
'_ The Phase I SFOC Transition Plan dated July 15, 1996.
The Panel has limited its concerns to safety wherever possible. Political and cost
considerations as well as institutional impacts have not been addressed except as
they may affect safety. Neither has the Panel addressed such non-safety issues as
financial incentives or the degree of managerial autonomy and flexibility available
to USA in order to achieve the challenging operational targets it has accepted.
These are separate issues outside the scope of the present task.
OBSERVATIONS
Based upon the Program Management Plan and the personnel, organization and
management philosophies of the United Space Alliance, the Space Flight
Operations Contract appears to be a comprehensive and workable document
espousing safety as paramount throughout.
Overall, the documentation reviewed reflects minimal adverse safety implications,
especially in the short term. This is largely because the people currently in place are
dedicated to making the new scheme work. There is some uncertainty about the
future, however. Careful and continuous monitoring by top management and the
safety organizations of both NASA and USA will be required to ensure continued
safe operations as new people come on the scene, budget pressures continue to
mount and the profit imperative increases on the part of the contractor.
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42 Reiterating that nothing seen in the SFOC arrangement is immediately threatening
to safety, and recognizing that the contract is in place and operating, the Panel
nevertheless offers the following observations:
• At this early stage of the SFOC, relations between NASA and USA appear
to be excellent, primarily due to the mutual faith, trust and integrity of the
people involved. While excellent now, over time these relationships could
deteriorate unless an adequate succession plan is developed and imple-
mented. The present key management personnel have known and worked
together fi_r many years. However, inevitably, these people will eventually be
replaced by others. It behooves both organizations to assure that successors to
the current incumbents are thoroughly acquainted with the intricacies of the
system and the people involved.
• While the plans for transition appear orderly, the actual transition should be
carefully monitored for unexpected developments, especially in the latter
stages. When these occur, flexible interpretations of the contract provisions
may be essential to resolve such conflicts in implementation while main-
taining the intent of the SFOC agreement.
• Diminishment of funding could derail an otherwise well planned SFOC
implementation. This could wreak hardships on people and foster an over
confident or "workaround" attitude, either of which could have serious safety
implications. While "safety" is a popular byword in the Space Shuttle pro-
gram, dollar constraints may limit the ability to perform the tasks necessary
to minimize risk. It is not evident how a situation such as this would be han-
dled should it develop.
• NASA believes it has restructured its organization in a manner to permit ade-
quate visibility into the SFOC contractor's operations. It is not clear that the
government workforce remaining after the completion of NASA downsizing
and reorganization will be sufficient to carry out insight responsibilities.
• The standards and metrics by which NASA will monitor the performance of
the SFOC contractor are primarily determined by the contractor, although
the government does retain approval authority over the type and scope of the
metrics adopted. There is little independence in this arrangement.
• The USA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) directors for ground and
flight operations report directly (i.e., hard-line) to the associate program
managers responsible for these activities, although they are free to communi-
cate (i.e., dotted-line) to the USA Vice President fi_r Safety and Mission
Assurance, who in turn reports to the USA Chief Executive Officer. While
this arrangement does not reflect completely independent reporting of
S&MA, it has been deemed acceptable, at least for Phase 1 of the transition,
and is consistent with the geographical dispersion of USA operations.
UndertheSFOC,thecontractorhastheresponsibilityfordealingwithobso-
lescenceandlogisticsupportissues.Theseactivitieswill demandincreased
attentionastimepassesandcouldleadto the needfor additionalfunding.
USA issilentonanyplansto addressthisissuein aperiodofdecliningbud-
gets.Whileit is likelythatnothingcanbedoneaboutit at thistime,thesit-
uationshouldbecloselymonitoredbyNASA astransitionproceedsinto the
latterphases.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 14.
Plans should be developed to assure that successor managers for both NASA and
the SFOC contractor are nurtured in an environment that cultivates mutual
respect and trust for one another typical of the excellent organization in place
today.
Recommendation 15.
NASA should continue to monitor the transition to the SFOC to assure that all
requirements are being met in an orderly way and that the safety of operations
remains the prime consideration.
Recommendation 16.
Congress and NASA should provide a level of funding sufficient to assure a safe
SFOC implementation.
Recommendation 17.
A periodic audit of the standards by which NASA monitors the safety performance
of the SFOC contractor should be conducted by an independent group.
Recommendation 18.
NASA and USA must maintain an adequate focus on resolving current and future
obsolescence and logistics support issues in order to avoid potential safety problems.
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MANIFEST/SHUTTLEUPGRADES
Assessment of the Manifest
The Space Shuttle flight manifest for the next six years is planned, at present, to
be at a rate of seven flights per fiscal year, except for FY 99 and FY 00 which have
eight flights each. A recommendation has been made through the Program
Operating Plan process to continue beyond FY 00 at eight flights per year with an
occasional surge to nine.
The manifest as of October 4, 1996, is shown in Figure 5-1, with a summary in
Figure 5-2. These show that there were eight flights in FY 96. Of the 51 flights
planned through FY 03, 33 are required for the International Space Station (ISS),
five for the Shuttle-Mir program, and the remaining 13 available for other oppor-
tunities. While the planned schedule does not exceed the rate achieved in FY 96
and, thus, may be viewed as an extension of a flight rate already demonstrated, this
schedule is, nevertheless, challenging. There are several reasons for this.
Principally, delays in the baseline schedule are beginning to be experienced in
delivery of Russian and, perhaps, U.S. hardware, and the assembly sequence is
strongly constrained at each stage of the process by required functionalities of each
succeeding ISS payload as shown in Figure 5-3. It is important to note that the first
six U.S. launches, 1A through 6A, must be in the given sequence, and that flight
4A cannot be launched until the second Russian mission, 2R, is successfully com-
pleted. Further, each of the ISS missions is unique in the requirements it places on
the crew and crew training so that the potential exists for the flight rate to be lim-
ited by the availability of training facilities and trained crews.
There is a concern that when launches slip there will be pressure to make up the
lost time, and this will be reflected eventually in "spurts" to higher rates over peri-
ods of a few months. Because of limited personnel availability, such spurts will, of
necessity, require considerable overtime with consequent fatigue and possible
degradation of safety of operations.
The stated and often repeated order of priority for NASA launch operations is
SAFETY, MANIFEST (i.e., schedule), and COST. The difficulty is that it is not
clearly evident when striving to maintain efficient and timely operations infringes
on safety. To the Panel's knowledge no effective, objective measures are available
to assess this interaction.
These concerns exist even with the presently planned launch rates and levels of
personnel. If an increased launch rate (e.g., 8 per year with surges to 9) is imposed,
none of the contractor or NASA personnel interviewed believe that it can reason-
ably and safely be achieved with presently planned personnel levels. There is a
belief that such a rate is feasible with increased resources; however, even more pres-
sure would be put on training and training facilities.
All of these scenarios are predicated on no loss of availability of a Space Shuttle or
Soyuz vehicle. The ISS program has recognized this and has initiated contingency
planning for such loss of availability. Nearly all such contingencies result in major
changes or delays to the Space Shuttle manifest and Russian launches. The Panel
has not attempted to assess such major perturbations.
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Figure5-2
SpaceShuttle Program
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The Influence of the Space Flight Operations Contract
The shift of operations to United Space Alliance (USA) is intended to be accom-
plished by transferring to the new organization a majority of the contractor per-
sonnel and equipment used in assembly and launch operations. Thus, it is initially
intended that all operations will continue to be performed by the same personnel
in the same facilities as in the past, only the organizational structure and, in some
cases, the division of responsibilities between NASA and contractor, would
change. Changes in such areas as procedures and numbers and skills mix of person-
nel are planned to ew)lve over a period of time in a controlled manner once
processes are found to be stable and trackable.
To the extent that this is true, there should be no change initially and, specifically,
no impact on the safety of operations. There are concerns about future personnel
issues, such as aging of the workfi)rce and replacing experienced people with new-
comers, but these concerns are not unique to the SFOC and are equally applicable
to the previous contractual arrangement. There is a worry that the emphasis in
going to this new way of business is primarily on cost. This is a difficult influence
to shake, and the structure of the incentive contract negotiated may turn out to
motivate the contractor in directions unanticipated by either party and thereby
compromise safety.
Shuttle Upgrades
Johnson Space Center (JSC) is the Lead Center for Space Shuttle performance
enhancements and upgrades and is proceeding on the basis that vehicle/
software/facility modifications are needed to support safe and cost effective Space
Shuttle operations into the next century. The JSC Engineering Directorate is lead-
ing a Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Team to identify and develop
upgrades. Team members have been drawn from multiple organizations and field
centers. This SE&I Team has now completed a comprehensive Space Shuttle
review which identified 134 items for upgrade. Top priority has been given to 31
of these. JgC has defined a phased approach to upgrades which accommodates
budget realities and ISS assembly commitments.
Presently, Space Shuttle upgrades can be grouped into the following main categories:
• Category/--Current and ongoing funded upgrades which include both Space
Shuttle performance enhancements and approved Space Shuttle safety
upgrades.
• Category 2--Near-term candidate Space Shuttle upgrades.
• Category 3--Mid- to long-term Space Shuttle upgrades which include major
system redesigns and concepts.
The ongoing performance improvements described in subsequent paragraphs are nec-
essary to meet ISS assembly commitments. These upgrades capitalize on current tech-
nology to achieve safety and reliability benefits. The near term candidate upgrades
address both those for safety, supportability or obsolescence and those which will
reduce processing costs or increase effectiveness. The third category targets high
value, major system upgrades requiring more extensive implementation, and possibly,
high value upgrades to the vehicle configuration. For purposes of this report, only
funded upgrades for ISS support and already planned safety upgrades were considered.
Ongoing Space Shuttle Performance Upgrades to Support ISS
The decision to place the ISS in an orbit inclined at 51.6 degrees rather than the
originally planned orbital inclination of 28.4 degrees for Space Station Freedom
results in a significant decrement in the payload capability for the current Space
Shuttle configuration. Studies indicated that a significant increase in payload capa-
bility of the Space Shuttle was required if the number of launches was to be kept
within reason and the constituent ISS assembly payload groupings were to be oper-
ationally sound. The Space Shuttle program, after further study, committed to a
payload capability of 35,000 pounds into a 220 nautical mile, 51.6 degree inclined
orbit which represented an increase of approximately 16,000 pounds of payload.
Achieving the payload increment required changes in hardware (weight), flight
design (trajectory), and operational factors--all without reducing reliability and
safety. In January 1994, a list of more than 50 candidate changes had been assem-
bled and was carefully scrutinized. A much smaller list was derived after more
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5O detailed evaluations that examined not only payload capability enhancement but
also reliability, safety, cost, development risk and schedule factors. This list was rec-
ommended to the ISS and Space Shuttle programs and was approved by the Space
Shuttle Program Requirements Change Board in March 1994.
Table 5-1 lists the details of the currently approved changes to the Space Shuttle
configuration and flight operations planned for performance enhancement. The list
shows that the most recent assessment of performance enhancement is over 17,200
pounds. It should be noted that the list does not include the Block II Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME) whose added weight was accounted for in the current baseline
configuration for performance calculation purposes. The Block 1I SSME, when
developed and certified, will have greater reliability and safety margin than the cur-
rent engine. The selective use of 104.5 percent thrust level will provide much
greater SSME safety margin than the current engine at 104 percent thrust.
The flight design changes are implemented by software updates and employ flight
techniques that have been demonstrated, in large part, by other launch vehicles.
The effects of flight control and sequencing changes are being verified via detailed
aerodynamics, control, structural and thermal analyses to ensure that no limits are
violated on the resulting trajectories.
More than half of the perfi_rmance enhancement comes from hardware changes.
Some of the weight reduction comes from the elimination of unused items such as
extra payload wiring harnesses, cargo compartment liner and some Orbiter wiring.
Substitution of lightweight crew seats for the current seats and refinement of
insulation also contribute to weight reduction. The largest increments of payload
capability come from the use of a "Super Lightweight Tank" (SLWT) to replace the
current "Lightweight Tank" (LWT). The SLWT employs a new lighter weight alloy
(Aluminum-Lithium, A1-2195) in its construction as well as an integrally stiffened
"Orthogrid" structural design for the barrel sections instead of the frame, stringer
and skin of the LWT. The SLWT replacement accounts for over 7,500 pounds of
performance enhancement.
Another source of major weight reduction, some 3,000 pounds, is the off-loading of
consumables, primarily orbital maneuvering system and reaction control system
propellants. All of the potential 3,000 pounds of the consumables would not be off-
loaded fi_r every flight. The off-load, if any, would be tailored to the individual
flight requirements. At a minimum, the consumable load would be determined
based upon Space Shuttle experience for end-of-mission requirements plus a
three-sigma reserve plus a mission contingency allowance for two additional days
of operation. At present, consumables are most frequently loaded to tank capacity
which allows fi_r more than two contingency days of operation. The "Hains IMU"
(High Accuracy Inertial Navigation System--lnertial Measurement Unit) entry in
Table 5-1 is a reduction in the propellant requirement fi_r control resulting from the
improved accuracy of this IMU rather than an off-load and is included in this cat-
egory fi_r bookkeeping convenience.
Table5-1
SpaceShuttleProgram--SpaceShuttleSystemsIntegrationOffice
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Presenter
MS/ROBERTD. WHITE
IDete
August 7, 1996
Orbiter 1.593 Crew Equip
Orbiter Mods 1,271 Crew "Core" Equip
Orbiter Nose Cap Blanket 10
Additional TPS Mods 312 Co.sumablee
Hains IMU
Lightweight Seats 245 Consumables Reductions
Orb WSB H20/APU Fuel Del
El" 7,592 Add. APU Fuel/H20 Reduct
SLWT 7,500 Ammonia Boiler omoad
Additional SLWT Mods 92
SRJ 0
LightweightSRB (Deleted) 0
Extended Air Exit Cone (Deleted) 0
STS Operator 1,002
P/L Wiring Harness 508
Remove Cargo Liner 155
Unused Orbiter Wiring 324
Orb Scar Removal 109
P/L.Recorder Removed 45
Leave Wiring for Manifesting -139
Performance IFIt Dson)
First Stage Yaw Steering
SSME Variable M/R (Deleted)
1st Stage Gimbal Change
2nd Stage Gimbal Change
Constant Pitch Rate
Post SRB Sep OMS Assist
Lower MECO Altitude
SRB Sep Timer Optimization
LO2 Press. Loading (Deleted)
Selective SSME Thrust (104.5)
TOTAL
382
382
3.91e
650
3,000
120
99
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2,4SS
5OO
0
270
125
5O
250
740
60
0
5OO
t7,227
"Presented uringdiscussionswithSpaceShuttleProgramanagement,JohnsonSpaceCenter,August7. 1996"
52 It should be noted that, in addition to the performance enhancements given in
Table 5-1, there is a Space Shuttle manager's reserve of 3,500 pounds and an
International Space Station manager's reserve of 1,300 pounds which provide
added margin of payload capability. These reserves can be released incrementally,
if necessary, as specific mission definitions are finalized. But, by current policy, the
Space Shuttle manager's reserve cannot be reduced below 700 pounds.
The Panel in its Annual Report for 1995 noted that there were potential safety
issues related t_ the Aluminum-Lithium (AI-Li) material to be used fi_r the primary
structure of the SLWT. These included welding processes that needed to be developed
and lower than expected fracture toughness of the AI-Li at cryogenic temperatures.
Since then, welding procedures have been satisfactorily developed and the first test
tank was successfully welded with minimum weld repairs needed.
To resolve the concern over fracture toughness of AI-Li at cryogenic temperatures,
procedures have been developed to subject the procured plate and sheet material
to a stringent series of tests in receiving inspection which will be used to select the
material for the critical locations of the SLWT. During manufacture of the finished
tank, a series of non-destructive tests, more stringent than had been used on the
LWT, will be applied to the production SI.WTs. Verification of these procedures is
contingent upon the satisfactory testing of the production hardware.
Other Approved Upgrades
In addition to the Space Shuttle performance enhancements discussed in the pre-
vious section, there are a number of ongoing Space Shuttle safety and performance
improvements presently in work such as:
• Multi-function Electronic Display System (MEDS): NASA has funded the
development and installation of a "glass cockpit" suite of displays for retrofit
into the Orbiters with the first planned flight on OV-104 in January 1999.
• Global Positioning System (GPS) : The replacement of the existing Tactical Air
Control and Navigation (TACAN) and Microwave Scanning Beam Landing
System (MSBLS) systems with a precise positioning GPS in a triple redun-
dant configuration has been initiated.
• Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM): A new
gas generator valve module is being designed and built to increase reliability
and reduce maintenance.
• Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)--Block I & II: Uprating of the SSME's to
increase engine safety and operability is being implemented as Block 1 and
Block II changes. Block I engines are presently being phased into the fleet.
The improved ruggedness and reliability of the Block II version, which is
entering its final development testing at Stennis Space Center, is critical to
the assembly and operation of the ISS.
• Solid Rocket Booster (SRB): Solid rocket booster upgrades presently focus on
aft skirt bracket modifications, saltwater activated release of main parachutes
and fi_el isolation valve poppet redesign.
Payload Integration Modifications: These modifications, all of which are geared
to ISS requirements, include upgrading items such as the remotely operated
electrical umbilical (ROEU), docking system, remotely operated fluid umbil-
ical (ROFU), grapple fixtures, Orbiter interface unit (1553 data bus) and
some associated items.
Launch and Landing Systems: These upgrades include possible replacement of
ozone depleting compounds and ground system improvements.
OBSERVATIONS
The Space Shuttle manifest for the next six years is challenging. Slips of several
months for individual launches are not unlikely. The constraints imposed by the
order of assembly of the ISS limit flexibility and may cause the slip of one launch
to impact several succeeding launches. This could cause peaking of the launch
schedule in the short and medium term that will increase costs. These peaks will
require all organizations to work harder, conceivably putting in extended hours
and overtime, implicitly resulting in an environment that can impact safety neg-
atively. The Panel believes that the most sensitive detector of potential safety
problems arising from assembly and launch crew fatigue and overwork is the expe-
rienced manager when allowed to make an unconstrained decision. Objective
measures can be an aid to such a decision but cannot substitute for it.
The planned schedule of seven launches per year, with surges to eight (7 or 8 per
year), is feasible with current personnel levels as has been demonstrated over
the past few years. These personnel levels may be lowered after several years by
carefully controlled methods that rely on proving that processes are stable and
trackable. In such an environment, achieving cost reduction goals that were set
years earlier may not be possible without compromising safety.
The suggested augmented schedule with a launch rate of eight launches per year
with surges to nine (8 or 9 per year), may be feasible with additional resources.
It is probably too early to make a proper judgment in view of all of the
changes underway.
There is no additional safety risk explicitly identifiable due to the move to an
SFOC contractor. The rewards and penalties of the SFOC incentive contract may
motivate the contractor to actions which are unanticipated by either party today
and may pose additional risks to safe operations.
The implications of personnel reductions were discussed in more detail in the sec-
tion on Downsizing. They are particularly important with respect to processing
and launch crews where reduced crew size and compressed schedules can lead to
longer hours worked with resulting fatigue and possible error or misjudgments.
The planned program fi_r Space Shuttle enhancements appears well conceived
and capable of meeting the needs of the International Space Station. Many of the
changes in work reduce risk as well, which provides an overall safety benefit to the
program. While the changes all seem conceptually sound, adequate testing and
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54 certification are required before they are used. Budget reductions could produce
pressures to shortcut these necessary steps even though the Space Shuttle program
is presently committed to fully adequate testing and certification plans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 19.
The Space Shuttle program and the SFOC contractor should continue to empha-
size safety first as a way of life and enforce the precedence of safety, manifest and
cost in Space Shuttle operations.
Recommendation 20.
NASA and SFOC contractor managements should enforce the safety priority using
good manageraent judgment and, if possible, derived measures of processing and
launch crew efficiency and fatigue as they affect the safety of operations.
Recommendation 21.
Any decision to move to a higher launch rate (8 or 9 per year) should be delayed
until more experience is gained with the new contractual setup and some of the ISS
launch constraints have been resolved.
Recommendation 22.
NASA should ensure that all enhancements and upgrades are fully tested and
assessed prior to implementation. Funding profiles and schedule pressures should
not be allowed to shorten any critical testing or validation processes.
APPENDICES
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 22,1996
The Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Dan:
In November of 1994, you chartered a team of individuals, led by
Dr. Christopher Kraft, to evaluate the Space Shuttle program. The team submitted its report
in March 1995 and provided NASA with several recommendations regarding program
management and implementation. Most notably, they recommended that consolidating
operations under a single business entity was the most advantageous approach. You have
moved out aggressively to implement this consolidation over this past year. Concurrent with
this activity, the agency has been implementing its reengineering initiatives, including
downsizing, in a constrained and challenging budget environment.
Times of rapid changes like these can produce risks as well as opportunities for
advancement. However, in our efforts to improve and streamline the program, we must
ensure that we do not inadvertently create unacceptable risks to safety. In light of the critical
importance the Space Shuttle system plays in our national space program, the President has
requested that I ask you to charge the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel to conduct a review
of issues associated with safe operation and management of the Space Shuttle program. The
paneI would review the effectiveness of the implementation of the Kraft recommendations,
the potential impact of these recommendations on safety, and provide other guidance it may
wish to offer. The panel should plan to provide a final report through NASA to the White
House (through OSTP) by late November.
I have asked my Associate Director for Technology, Lionel S. Johns, to work with
you on this important issue.
Sincerely,
Joh_Gibbons
Assistarl_fthe President
for
Science and Technology

National Aeronautic and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-001
Mr. Paul M. Johnstone
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
24181 Old House Cove Road
St. Michaels, MD 21663
Dear Mr. Johnstone:
The White House has requested that I charge the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel to conduct a review of any potentially significant safety impacts
resulting from changes being made to improve and streamline Space Shuttle
operations. The Terms of Reference (TOR) that outline the scope of the review
is enclosed.
The panel should plan to provide a final report to the White House,
through NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, by late
November. You can be assured of receiving the highest level of support from
the NASA team during your review, and we look forward to your findings.
Sincerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
Enclosure

May 30, 1996
TERMS OF REFERENCE
SPACE SHUTTLE REVIEW
CONDUCTED BY THE AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL (ASAP)
PURPOSE: Over the past three years, NASA has made tremendous progress in
reshaping the management and organizational structure of the Agency. Many of these
changes have taken place within the Space Shuttle program, including the planned
consolidation of operations under a single contractor, downsizing the Shuttle workforce,
and reducing costs of operations and management. In light of these changes, a review is
warranted to ensure that efforts to improve and streamline the Space Shuttle program do
not inadvertently create unacceptable risk.
BACKGROUND: The Space Shuttle program has been in a "restructuring" mode since
fiscal year 1992. Dramatic reductions in program costs (approximately 25 percent) have been
realized over the last 4 years. In early 1995, a more focused set of initiatives were
started that included such elements as reviewing operational requirements, reexamining
the safety and mission assurance activities, consolidating contracts where possible, closing
facilities as appropriate, and attempting to minimize civil servant involvement in
operations. To meet these goals, several studies were initiated including the Functional
Workforce Review, the Zero Base Review, internal Program/Project-manager-led
assessments, and the external, independent study known as the "Kraft Review."
SCOPE: The review will focus on potentially significant safety impacts of the:
Implementation plan for the transition of Shuttle program management to the
Lead Center
• Transition plan for downsizing to anticipated workforce levels
• Implementation of a phased transition to a prime contractor for operations
• Planned safety and performance upgrades for Space Station assembly
• Maintenance of independent safety oversight
• Shuttle flight rate for Space Station assembly
• Communications among NASA Centers and Headquarters
APPROACH: The ASAP will first be briefed by NASA Headquarters. The results from
previous Space Shuttle safety reviews and prior reviews/assessments of the planned
changes including GAO, NASA Advisory council and previous ASAP studies will be
provided.
It is anticipated that the ASAP will want to visit each of the OSF Centers to obtain insight
on the implementation of management changes including:
• guidelines and policy
• status
• planned milestones and timetable
• checks and balances to assure maintenance of safety in flight operations
• problems, issues and concerns
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The ASAP will be provided access to all personnel necessary to accomplish their task
within the constraints of legal implications of SFOC negotiations. Additionally, the ASAP
will be scheduled so that their activities will not interfere with ongoing Shuttle operations.
Prior to the preparation of their findings, the ASAP will be provided an opportunity to
review with NASA Shuttle management any questions or issues that were not fully
answered or that may require further clarification.
ORGANIZATION: The ASAP will administratively be supported by Code Q. In
addition to a flight experienced Shuttle commander, a Shuttle program point of contact
(POC) will also be designated to work with the ASAP and Code Q- 1. The POC's
function will be to act as the coordinator for setting up appropriate briefings (both
schedule and content), identify the appropriate personnel that may be needed to provide
special topic discussions/briefings, facilitate the responses to ASAP questions or provide
ASAP with requested review documents.
PRODUCT: The ASAP will prepare a final report on their findings through the NASA
Administrator to the White House.
SCHEDULE:
Review, preparation, and organization
HQ briefing to ASAP
Visits to Shuttle Centers
Briefing of Findings to
NASA Administrator
Submission of Report and briefing to
OVP, OSTP, and OMB
June 1996
July
August
Mid-November
Late November
National Aeronautic and
Space Administration
Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-001
Reply to Attn of: (_- 1 June 12, 1995
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel looks forward to conducting its assessment and advising
NASA on the impact of streamlining changes to the safety of Space Shuttle operations, a subject
that is vital to the future of our nation's space program. Please be assured that the Panel will do
its best to provide an honest and candid evaluation.
Sincerely,
Paul M. Johnstone
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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JuLY 25, 1996 NASA HEADQUARTERS
• Objectives/Scope of Study
Headquarters/Space Shuttle Program Office/
Lead Center Roles and Responsibilities
• Performance Upgrades
Manifest/Space Shuttle Flight Rate
Transition to a Space Flight Operations
Contract (SFOC)
Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight
Daniel S. Goldin,
NASA Administrator
Wilbur C. Trafton,
Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
Steve Oswald, Deputy
Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
Steve Oswald
Steve Oswald
Frederick D. Gregory,
Associate Administrator
for Safety and Mission
Assurance
AUGUST 6-8,
August 6, 1996
• Space Shuttle Program Management Transition
to a Lead Center
1996 JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight
Operations Transition to a SFOC
• Interview with Space Shuttle Program Manager
August 7, 1996
• Shuttle Performance Enhancements
and Upgrades
Space Shuttle Flight Rate for Space
Station Assembly
George W. S. Abbey,
Director, Johnson Space
Center
Charles S. Harlan
Jack C. Boykin
Robert B. Sieck
JoAnn H. Morgan
Jay H. Greene
Jon C. Harpold
Tommy W. Holloway
Lambert D. Austin
Jay H. Greene
Leonard S. Nicholson
Michelle Brekke
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• Interview with Commander, STS-71 mission Robert L. Gibson
68 Interview with Associate Director (Technical)
United Space Alliance (USA) Management/
Organization
USA Program Management/Transition Plans
Ground Operations/Processing
Flight Operations Transition
Safety & Mission Assurance Transition
Discussions/Interviews with USA Management
on Downsizing/Transition to a SFOC
• Interviews/Discussions on NASA Downsizing
with JSC Human Resources Management
August 8, 1996
• Effects of NASA Restructuring on
Space Station Program
• Independent Assessment Concerns and Issue
• Contingency Plans for Delays
Space Station Hardware Fabrication
Interview with Center Director
John W. Young
Kent M. Black
Glynn Lunney
Michael McCulley
Harold Draughton
Harry Jupin
Kent Black
Jim Adamson
Joseph Hammond
Harvey Hartman
Greg Hayes
Randy Brinkley
Henry W. Hartsfield
Dennis A. Kross
Keith Reilly
Frank Musil
Dennis A. Kross
George W. S. Abbey
AUGUST 14,
Interview with Deputy Associate Administrator,
Office of Space Flight on NASA Downsizing
Interview with Associate Administrator for
Headquarters Operations on NASA Downsizing
1996 NASA HEADQUARTERS
Richard J. Wisniewski
Michael D. Christensen
AUGUST 20-23, 1996 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
August 20, 1996
• Discussions on NASA Downsizing and KSC JoAnn H. Morgan
Robert B. Sieck
August 21, 1996
• DiscussionsonTransitionto aSFOCand
andtheLeadCenter
August 22, 1996
• DiscussionsonTransitionof SupportFacilities
andFunctionsUndertheSFOCandMaintenance
of IndependentSafetyOversight
August 23, 1996
• Discussion on Maintenance of Independent
Safety Oversight and Assessment
JoAnn H. Morgan
James A. Thomas
Robert B. Sieck
P. Thomas Breakfield
Ann Montgomery
Michael McCulley
Gary A. Cantwell
Richard H. Jolley
Robert B. Sieck
JoAnn H. Morgan
E Thomas Breakfield
Michael McCulley
Harry Jupin
Joel Reynolds
James A. Thomas
James A. Kelley
James L. Jennings
AUGUST 27-28,
August 27, 1996
• Discussions with Space Station Program on
Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight
August 28, 1996
• Discussions with Johnson Space Center
Management on Maintenance of Independent
Safety Oversight
1996 JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
Randy Brinkley
George W. S. Abbey
Charles S. Harlan
Henry W. Hartsfield
John Young
James Wetherbee
AUGUST 29, 1996 STENNIS SPACE CENTER
Discussions with Stennis Management on
Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight
and Lead Center
Roy Estess, Director,
Stennis Space Center
John Gasery
69
7O Discussions with Lockheed Martin, Manned
Space Systems, on Maintenance of Independent
Safety Oversight
Jerry Smelser
Terry L. Hibbard
Earl McNail
John White
Harold Bencas
Mike Smiles
Jay Mullaly
Patricia Powel
Larry Knauder
Robert Hieter
David Schwartz
SEPTEMBER 3, 1996 JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
• Telephone Conference Call on Maintenane of John H. Casper
Independent Safety Oversight
SEPTEMBER 6, 1996 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
Discussions with Marshall Space Flight
Center Management on Maintenance of
Independent Safety Oversight
J. Wayne Littles, Director,
Marshall Space Flight
Center
Robert J. Schwinghamer
Alex A. McCool
James H. Ehl
SEPTEMBER 6, 1996
• Lead Center/Transition to SFOC Discussions Christopher C. Kraft
SEPTEMBER 10, 1996 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
• Discussions on Downsizing J. Wayne Littles
Tereasa Washington
SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
Discussions/Interviews with Marshall Space
Flight Center Management on Transition to
Lead Center
J. Wayne Littles
James H. Ehl
Gerald C. Ladner
Parker V. Counts
James H. Kennedy
V. Keith Henson
Alex A. McCool
SEPTEMBER17, 1996 DRYDENFLIGHT RESEARCHCENTER
DiscussionsonLeadCenterandtheTransition
to aSFOCandMaintenaneof Independent
SafetyOversight
KennethJ.Szalai,Director,
DrydenFlight
ResearchCenter
SEPTEMBER 19, 1996 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
* Discussions on Space Shuttle Performance Robert Minor
Enhancements and the Transition to a SFOC Jay H. Greene
OCTOBER 2, 1996
• Telephone Conference with KSC Center
Director on Lead Center/Communications and
Transition to a SFOC
Jay E Honeycutt, Director,
Kennedy Space Center
OCTOBER 8-10,
October 8, 1996
• Discussions with Solid Rocket Booster Project
Management on Transitions to a SFOC and
Status of Space Shuttle Enhancements
• NASA Headquarters Office of Space Flight
Presentation on Communication Plans
• Discussions with Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
Project on Upgrades, Transition to SFOC and
Flight Rate Surges
• Discussions with Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) Project on Upgrades and Support to
Flight Rates Surges
• Discussions with External Tank Project on
Space Shuttle Upgrades and Support to Flight
Rate Surges
1996 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
James H. Kennedy
Russell Bardos
V. Keith Henson
Gerald C. Ladner
Parker V. Counts
Mike Pessin
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72 October 9, 1996
Presentation by Safety and Mission Assurance
on Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight
During Downsizing and Transition to SFOC
October 10, 1996
Discussions with Director of Safety and Mission
Assurance on Maintenance of Independent Safety
Oversight During Downsizing, Transition to
SFOC and Budget Reductions
John M. Livingston
James H. Ehl
AEROSPACE
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JOHNSTONE, PAUL M. (CHAIRMAN)
Mr. Paul Johnstone spent his career in engineering design, development, acquisi-
tion, and operation of commercial aircraft. After obtaining his B.S. degree in
Aeronautical Engineering from the University of Notre Dame in 1946, he joined
the Douglas Aircraft Company, where he was first an aircraft performance engineer
and then a stability and control engineer engaged in aircraft design and certifica-
tion. After 5 years as an Operations Engineer and later head of Technical
Operations fi)r Hawaiian Airlines, he joined Eastern Airlines as Manager of
Economic and Performance Analysis in the Development and Engineering Group.
At Eastern, Mr. Johnstone rose to Vice President, Engineering, and later Senior
Vice President, Operations Services. In those positions, he directed evaluations and
was responsible for engineering, quality assurance, maintenance, inventory
management and control, production planning and control and purchasing. In
addition, he was corporate technical representative at all Eastern accident investi-
gations. Mr. Johnstone is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics. Mr. Johnstone became a member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel in September 1992, after joining the Panel as a consultant in 1991. He has
been Chairman since March 1995.
BLOMBERG, RICHARD D. (DEPUTY CHAIRMAN)
Mr. Richard Blomberg is President of Dunlap and Associates, Inc. a human factors
and systems analysis research and consulting firm. He has directed or been involved
in the application of human engineering and systems analytic principles to aircraft
design and certification, aerospace research, highway safety, product safety and the
design and evaluation of human-computer interfaces. He holds a patent for a pilot
workload measurement approach which has been accepted worldwide as part of the
minimum crew certification of commercial aircraft. He also developed techniques
used in the certification of the first "glass cockpit" in a commercial transport and
an early version of the flight management system. Mr. Blomberg is also a member
of NASA's Life and Biomedical Sciences and Applications Advisory
Subcommittee. Mr. Blomberg became a member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel in 1990 after joining the Panel as a consultant in 1987.
BRILL, YVONNE C. (MEMBER)
Ms. Yvonne Brill is presently a consultant specializing in satellite technology and space
propulsion systems. Since retiring from the International Maritime Satellite
Organization (1NMARSAT) in 1991, Ms. Brill has served as a member of several U.S.
National Research Council Committees of pertinent space transportation systems.
At INMARSAT, Ms. Brill managed the Space Segment Engineering activities on
the Combined Propulsion System for the four INMARSAT-2 satellites which are
now operational. Prior to INMARSAT, Ms. Brill has held several managerial and
engineering positions including the Manager of the Solid Rocket Motor at NASA
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74 Headquarters from June 1981 to June 1983. Earlier, at RCA Astro-Electronics, she
managed the fabrication and qualififcation of a Teflon solid propellant pulsed
plasma propulsion system whose successful utilization on the NOVA satellite
brought electric propulsion to an operational status in the United States. Her
patented invention, while at RCA, the electrothermal hydrazine thruster, is still
widely used on operational commercial communication satellites manufactured by
RCA/GE/Lockheed Martin Astro-Space.
Ms. Brilt is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the
International Academy of Astronautics and a Fellow of the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Society of Women Engineers. Ms. Brill
joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a member in November 1994.
DUNN, ROBERT E (MEMBER)
Vice Admiral Robert Dunn is the former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air
Warfare. He is an experienced Naval Aviator having commanded a carrier
squadron, a carrier air wing, an aircraft carrier and a carrier battle group. He is
presently an aerospace and defense consultant, author and commentator. VADM
Dunn joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a member in 1990.
ENGLAR, KENNETH G. (MEMBER)
Mr. Englar is currently a launch vehicle and systems engineering consultant to com-
mercial satellite companies. Prior to his retirement from McDonnell Douglas
Corporation in 1987, he was Chief Engineer and previously Chief Design Engineer of
the Delta Launch Vehicle, incrementally increasing its payload to geosynchronous
transfer orbit from 2,100 pounds to 4,000 pounds. He was responsible for the design and
development of the current Delta II and led the engineering team that, in 15 months
from design start to launch, successfully developed the Delta 180 launch vehicle for the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. He also managed the design integration o!
spacecrafts on more than 70 Delta missions, including a string of 43 successive success-
ful missions. Previously, Mr. Englar was Chief Engineer for the Laboratory vehicle of the
U.S. Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory. He received a B.S. degree in Engineering
from Columbia University and in World War II, served in the Manhattan Project at
Los Alamos. Mr. Englar joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a consultant in
October 1995 and became a member in October 1996.
GLEGHORN, GEORGE J. (MEMBER)
Dr. George Gleghorn was vice president and chief engineer for TRW's Space and
Technology Group overseeing design integration, reliability and product integrity
of all TRW spacecraft. During his 37 years at TRW, he contributed to a wide range
of distinguished spacecraft: Pioneer 1, Pioneer 5, INTELSAT II1, the Orbiting
Geophysical Observatories, and NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
andnumerousDepartmentofDefensespacecraft.Dr.Gleghornplayedakeyrolein
manyofTRW'srecord-breakingsatellites,includingPioneer10andPioneer6. He
wasalsoinvolvedin thedevelopmentoftheAtlas,TitanandThorballisticmissiles
for theU. S.Air Force.Priorto TRW,heworkedat HughesAircraftandtheJet
PropulsionLaboratory.In recentyears,hehasbeenateammemberindesignreviews
andindependentreadinessreviewsof HubbleSpaceTelescope,theCassinispace-
craftandmissionandtheAdvancedX-RayAstronomicalFacility,andhaschaired
2 NationalResearchCouncilstudiesrelatedto orbitaldebris.Dr.Gleghomis a
FellowoftheAmericanInstituteof AeronauticsandAstronauticsandamemberof
theNationalAcademyof Engineering.Dr.GleghornjoinedtheAerospaceSafety
AdvisoryPanelasamemberin December1992.
HIMMEL, SEYMOURC. (MEMBER)
Dr. SeymourHimmelwasthe AssociateDirectorof theLewisResearchCenter
responsibleforoverseeingall developmentandspaceflightprojectsat theCenter.
HejoinedtheNationalAdvisoryCommitteeforAeronautics(NACA) in 1948as
anAeronauticalResearchScientistandconductedandsupervisedbothanalytical
andexperimentalresearchin avarietyof fieldsincludingaeropropulsionsystem:
cycles,components,rotatingmachineryand dynamicsand control.With the
adventofNASAhefocusedonresearchinto liquidandsolidrocketpropulsionand
otherspacepropulsionsystemsand their applicationto spaceflight missions.
Subsequently,hemanagedalaunchvehicleprojectbeingresponsibleforlaunching
suchmissionsasRanger,MarinerMars,the OrbitingGeophysicalObservatory
Satellite(OGOS)andNimbus.As Directorof RocketsandVehiclesatLewis,he
oversawthe launchof theSurveyor,LunarOrbiter,Viking,HeliosandVoyager
missionsaswellasthedevelopmentof theTitan/Centaurlaunchvehicleandthe
developmentand operationof the SERTII electricpropulsionspacecraft.He
serveda tour at NASA Headquartersas DeputyAssociateAdministrator
(Technology)of theOfficeofAeronauticsandSpaceTechnology.Dr.Himmelhas
beenamemberandconsultantto theAerospaceSafetyAdvisoryPanelsince1975.
KRONE, NORRIS J., JR. (MEMBER)
Dr. Norris Krone is currently the Executive Director, University Research
Foundation, University of Maryland. Previous positions held by Dr. Krone include:
Vice President for Special Projects, BDM Corporation; Office Director, Air
Vehicles Technology Office, Defense Advanced Rese.arch Projects Agency
(DARPA); Program Manager, Forward Swept Wing, X-Wing, DARPA; Assistant
to the CDR for Acquisition and Costs Analysis, Andrews Air Force Base,
Maryland; Chief, Joint Services Action Group JLC, Air Force Systems Command,
Andrews Air Force Base; Manager of Advanced Development for Reconnaissance,
HQ USAF; Technical Manager, Aeroelastic Programs, Chief of C-133 Airframe
Design Review, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio. Dr. Krone joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a member in 1987.
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76 VOLZ, RICHARD A. (MEMBER)
Dr. Richard Volz is Department Head of the Computer Science Department at
Texas A&M University. Prior to his current position, Dr. Volz was Director of the
Robotics Research Laboratory and Professor of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science at the University of Michigan. He has served on three federal
advisory boards in addition to the Aerospace Advisory Panel (ASAP): 1) the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board, 2) the Ada Board, and 3) the NASA Space
Station Advisory Panel. He has received the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian
Service from the U.S. Air Force and the NASA Special Service Award. Dr. Volz's
research interests lie in languages for real-time, embedded, distributed computing
manufacturing software and robotics. For the past decade, he has been a leader in
the development of technology for the distributed Ada programs, having led the
efforts for the development of several generations of distributed Ada systems. In the
robotics and manufacturing arena, he has worked on languages for robots, manu-
facturing software, vision systems, grasping and manipulation, and is currently
Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions on Robotics and Automation. Dr. Volz
received his B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in Electrical Engineering from
Northwestern University in 1960, 1961, and 1964 respectively, Dr. Volz joined the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a member in 1986.
DONLAN, CHARLES J. (CONSULTANT)
Mr. Charles Donlan joined the research staff of the Langley Memorial Aeronautical
Laboratory, then part of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), the predecessor to NASA, in 1938. His career with NACA and NASA as
an engineer and manager involved a broad range of aeronautical and space activities.
He served as an Associate Director of Project Mercury, 1958-1961, and as the
Langley Research Center's Deputy Director, 1961-1968. He was named the Deputy
Associate Administrator (Technical) for Space Flight at NASA Headquarters, 1968,
and served in that capacity until his retirement in 1976. During this period, he also
served as the Acting Director of the Space Shuttle Program, 1970-1973. Since 1976,
he has been an aerospace consultant to government and industry, notably with the
Institute fi_r Defense Analysis. Mr. Donlan became a consultant to the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel in 1994 and joined the Panel as a member in 1983.
FITCH, DENNIS E., SR. (CONSULTANT)
Mr. Dennis Fitch is a B-757/767 Captain tor United Airlines. He received a B.S.
degree from Duquesne University and received his flight training from the United
States Air Force. He is President of D.E. Fitch & Associates, an aviation consult-
ing firm specializing in Cockpit Resource Management and human factors. Captain
Fitch has had the unique experience of crash landing a DC-10 that lost all
hydraulics and all flight controls. He and the crew hold the distinguished record ot
the longest time aloft without flight controls who lived to tell about it. Captain
FitchhasbeencommendedbyPresidentGeorgeBushandistherecipientofSenate
Resolution174,101stCongressfor hisoutstandingeffort,poiseandcouragein
assistingthecrewin attemptingadifficultemergencylandingatSiouxCity,Iowa.
Hehasgivennumerouspresentationsto variouscorporateaviationdepartments
andisalsoindemandforhisinspirationalandmotivationalprogram.CaptainFitch
isrecognizedfi_rhisextensivexperienceasaflight instructorandcheckairman.
Hehasaccumulatedover15,000 hours of flight time and is an FAA check pilot
designee. Captain Fitch joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a consul-
tant in June 1995.
KAUDERER, BERNARD M. (CONSULTANT)
Vice Admiral Bernard M. Kauderer, a consultant to industry and government,
also serves as a Director of the General Physics Corporation and of Digital
Systems Resources Corporation. He is the former Commander of the Submarine
Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet. After graduating from the U.S.
Naval Academy in 1953, VADM Kauderer served on the destroyer USS The
Sullivans and then as Executive Officer in the minesweeper, USS Hummingbird.
VADM Kauderer served as Damage Control Assistant in the Polaris missile sub-
marine USS Robert E. Lee, as Engineer Officer in the attack submarine USS
Skipjack and then as Executive Officer in USS Ulysses S. Grant. VADM
Kauderer also served as Deputy Director, Research, Development Test and
Evaluation on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. He has commanded:
Submarine Group FIVE in San Diego, the nuclear attack submarine USS BARB,
the Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit in Idaho Falls, and the submarine tender
USS Dixon. VADM Kauderer joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a
consultant in April 1996.
MCDONALD, JOHN F. (CONSULTANT)
Mr. John McDonald is the former Vice President Maintenance and Engineering for
the Flying Tiger Line and also Vice President Technical Services for Tiger Air, a
corporate jet service and modification company. Under Mr. McDonald's direction,
the all-cargo airline achieved the best reliability rates in the industry from 1968 to
1979. He was elected to the Board of Directors of Flying Tiger Line in 1975 and
retired in 1982. His earlier experience included fifteen years with Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation principally in engineering and service support roles as
Division Engineer, Service Engineering Division. Prior to joining Lockheed,
McDonald served 12 years with BOAC (the predecessor of British Airways), his
final position being that of Chief Technical Officer. He is a chartered engineer on
the United Kingdom Register and is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society
and Institute of Mechanical Engineers. He is also a Fellow of the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Society of Automotive
Engineers. Mr. McDonald joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a men>
ber in 1980 and continues as a consultant from 1992.
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78 PARMET, NORMAN R. (CONSULTANT) (CHAIRMAN: 7/90-3/95)
Mr. Norman Parmet is the former Vice President, Engineering and Quality
Assurance, TWA. He was responsible for the direct operation of three areas within
TWA including: engineering with technical responsibility for the airline opera-
tional fleet; technical development with technical and contractual responsibility
for the evaluation and construction of new aircraft types and their systems; and
quality assurance with overall responsibility to assure compliance of all technical
standards set by engineering and manufacturers. Mr. Parmet served on the National
Research Council's Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Panel.
Mr. Parmet joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a member in 1982.
STEWART, JOHN G. (CONSULTANT)
Dr. John Stewart is presently a partner in Stewart & Associates, a management
consulting firm located in Knoxville, Tennessee. He previously served as Executive
Director of the Consortium of Research Institutions in Knoxville, Tennessee. The
Consortium sponsors collaborative scientific and technological endeavors among
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the University of Tennessee the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) and the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge
Operations. He also served as Vice President for economic and community devel-
opment and Assistant General Manager (Administration) at TVA (1980-93).
Prior to TVA, Dr. Stewart served as Assistant Director of the American Political
Science Association (1961-62); Legislative Assistant and subsequently Executive
Assistant to Senator and Vice President Hubert H Humphrey (1962-69); Director
of Communications at the Democratic National Committee (1970-73); Staff
Director of the Energy Subcommittee, Joint Economic Committee (1975-77), and
Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Science,Technology and Space
(1977-79). Dr. Stewart joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a member
in 1980, then became a consultant after completing his term in 1992.
GREGORY, FREDERICK D. (Ex-OFF1CIO)
Mr. Fred Gregory is the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance at
NASA Headquarters. He is responsible for assuring the safety, reliability, and quality
of all NASA programs. He has extensive experience as an astronaut, test pilot, and
manager of flight safety programs and launch support operations. He has logged over
6,500 hours in more than 50 types of aircraft, including 455 hours in space and 550
combat missions in Vietnam. He holds an FAA commercial and instrument certificate
for single- and multi-engine airplanes and helicopters. Mr. Gregory joined the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as an ex-officio member in 1992.
STARKEY_NORMAN B. (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)
Mr.NormanStarkeywasnamedtheExecutiveDirectorfor theAerospaceSafety
AdvisoryPanelinAugust1996.Priorto thisassignmentheservedastheManager,
SpaceShuttleHeadquartersOffice,Officeof SpaceFlight, wherehe wasthe
Headquartersfocalpoint on SpaceShuttlemattersto otherNASA officesand
externalinterfaces.Mr. StarkeyjoinedNASA in February1970asaco-opstudent
at theGoddardSpaceFlightCenter(GSFC).At GSFCheworkedasaStructural
DynamicsandMechanicalSystemsEngineeron the DeltaProject,and asthe
MechanicalSystemsManagerfortheOSS-1payloadthatflewonSTS-3.In 1980,
he transferredto Headquarters,wherehehasworkedin numerousmanagement
positionsontheSpaceShuttleProgram.Mr.StarkeyreceivedhisBachelorsDegree
in AerospaceEngineeringin 1972and his MastersDegreein Aerospace
Engineeringin 1978,bothfromtheUniversityof Maryland.He laterreturnedto
the University of Marylandand earnedhis MastersDegreein Business
Administrationin 1987.He has receivednumerousNASA commendations,
includingtheNASAExceptionalServiceMedalandtheSilverSnoopyAward.
MANNING, FRANK L. (TECHNICAL ASSISTANT)
Mr.FrankManning,priorto hispresentassignment,wastheExecutiveDirectorof
the AerospaceSafetyAdvisoryPanel (January1994-August1996).As the
TechnicalAssitantto thePanel,he isdirectlyresponsibleformanagingandcoor-
dinatingtechnicalspecialassignmentsgivento thePanel(includingthisSpecial
Reportto the White House:Review of Issues Associated with Safe Operation and
Management of the Space Shuttle Program). Prior to his assignment to the Panel in
January 1994, he served as the Manager, Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
for U.S./Russian Programs. Mr. Manning joined NASA in 1963 at the Lewis
Research Center after graduating from the University of Michigan. During his
career of over 30 years with NASA, he has had a wide range of assignments includ-
ing: Test Conductor on basic rocket research projects; Launch Vehicle Project
Engineer for Titan/Centaur and Atlas/Centaur; Manager, Systems Engineering and
Integration for Shuttle/Centaur; and Manager of the NASA Aerospace Battery
Program. Mr. Manning came to NASA Headquarters in 1989.
HARMAN, PATRICIA M. (STAFF ASSISTANT)
Ms. Patricia Harman joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in August 1989,
as Staff Assistant. Prior to this assignment, she served as personal secretary to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality
Assurance (in addition to lead secretary for the entire office), as well as secretary
to the NASA Chief Engineer, Associate Administrator for STS Operations,
NASA Executive Officer, and to various directors in the Space Shuttle and Apollo
Programs. Ms. Harman has been with NASA since March 1964.
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8O POINTS OF CONTACT
In addition to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel staff, the Panel was assisted
by the following NASA personnel who helped obtain required materials and
coordinate briefings:
Russell Bardos, Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters
Brian Duffy, Assistant Director (Technical), Johnson Space Center
William C. Hill, Office of Safety & Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters
James A. Kelley, Safety and Mission Assurance, Kennedy Space Center
Linder L. Metts, Jr., Space Shuttle Projects Office, Marshall Space Flight Center
Carl B. Shelley, Space Shuttle Program, Johnson Space Center
